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ABSTRACT
China’s adoption of its European Union-style Anti-Monopoly Law
2007 was heralded with great fanfare. However, some thirteen years
following adoption, the 2007 Law’s aims appear neutered by the 2007
Law’s so-called “public interest” feature: normal competition protection
objectives appear to be sidelined in the pursuit of wider industrial policy
goals, even to the extent that obviously anti-competitive market practices
are tolerated across the industrial and services landscape. Via a series of
original case studies, the Authors demonstrate how China’s approach
markedly diverges from European Union competition ideals, in turn
raising the significant question of whether competition philosophy has
been accepted in China. The Authors address the current unsatisfactory
situation, setting out detailed proposals for substantive and structural
reform, aimed at enhancing the regulatory institutions so that their
enforcement competence is not compromised. Drawing on European
Union judicial architecture and practice, the Article also makes proposals
designed to enhance the capacity of the enforcement institutions, all with
a view towards enhancing the acceptance of universally understood
competition norms in China’s political and administrative-dominated
business culture.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article seeks to answer the important question of
whether the China Anti-Monopoly Law 20071 has succeeded in
introducing a competition (“antitrust”) philosophy in China by
examining practices in a number of key industries. In 2007, when
China was deciding what form of competition law to adopt, China
decided to follow the European Union antitrust approach to a
significant extent. 2 However, as this Article shall demonstrate,
since 2007, China has tolerated anti-competitive activities which
appear to be contrary to the competition principles proclaimed
in the 2007 Act. Regard for the 2007 Act’s commonly understood
competition objectives 3 appear to have been relegated to the
sideline.4 This Article shall examine the source of this divergence,
1. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fanlongduanfa (中华⼈⺠共和国反垄断法)
[The Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008) 2007
STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 68 (China).
2. For example, several concepts in the 2007 Act use similar terminology and
concepts to those used in European Union competition law. See, e.g., id. arts. 13-15, 1719, 20-22. All of these Articles are key elements in the European Union competition legal
framework, as well. See generally Yong Ren, Fengyi Zhang & Jie Liu, Insights of China’s
Competition Law and its Enforcement: the Structural Reform of Anti-Monopoly Authority and the
Amended Anti-Unfair Competition Law, 10 J. EUR. COMPETITION L. & PRAC. 35 (2019);
Giacomo Di Federico, The New Anti-Monopoly Law in China from a European Perspective, 32
WORLD COMPETITION 249 (2009); H. Stephen Harris Jr., The Making of an Antitrust Law:
The Pending Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 169 (2006);
Eleanor M. Fox, An Anti-Monopoly Law for China – Scaling the Walls of Government Restraints,
75 ANTITRUST L.J. 173 (2008).
3. Article 1 of the 2007 Act refers to the competition objectives of “protection of
fair market competition, enhancing economic efficiency, [and] maintaining the
consumer interests.” These competition objectives are commonly found in modern
competition legal frameworks worldwide. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Fanlongduanfa (中华⼈⺠共和国反垄断法) [The Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30,
2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), art. 1, 2007 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ.
68 (China).
4 . China’s chief antitrust policy-maker and regulatory authority for the
enforcement of antitrust law in China—State Administration for Market Regulation
(“SAMR”)—has also raised this concern: in its 2020 reform proposals titled “Draft (for
public comment) on the Amendment of the Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 of China”
(published Jan. 2020), SAMR drew attention to this development. Its reform proposals
call for the 2007 Act to clarify that the primary focus of the 2007 Act should be the
protection of competition, rather than other interests. In this respect, SAMR has
proposed that the Competition objectives set out in the 2007 Act (“fair market
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which appears to be grounded in the presence in the 2007 Act of
a distinct feature, quite unlike that found in the European Union
regime. 5 This distinct feature is the reference to the “public
interest” in the Act.6 In this regard, this Article shall demonstrate
that China tolerates practices even though they run counter to the
protection of competition. Unlike the European Union where
competition, enhancing economic efficiency, maintaining the consumer interests”)
should be the predominate consideration in the observance of the 2007 Act, with
interventions in the public interest to be confined only to situations where intervention
would be “limited and necessary.” Thus, SAMR is making it clear that it is concerned
about the manner in which excessive intervention by State authorities has prioritized the
interests of State-owned market players. In the process, it has relegated the competition
focus of the 2007 Act to an inferior position. Article 10 of SAMR’s reform proposals call
for the establishment of a “fair competition review system” so that markets will comply
with competition rules, with limited intervention by administrative authorities only
where necessary. See Fanlongduanfa Xiuding Cao’an (Gongkai Zhengqiu Yijiangao) (《
反 垄 断 法 》 修 订 草 案 ( 公 开 征 求 意 ⻅ 稿 )) [Draft (for public comment) on the
Amendment of the Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 of China] (promulgated by the State
Admin. for Mkt Regul., Jan. 2, 2020).
5. The European Union Competition criteria include the protection of efficiency,
innovation, and consumer welfare, with no mention of any criterion constituting a
“public interest” criterion (or indeed anything like it), unlike China’s 2007 Act
referencing “the public interest.” Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fanlongduanfa (中华
⼈⺠共和国反垄断法) [The Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug.
1, 2008), art. 1, 2007 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 68 (China). For the
European Union Competition criteria, see Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union art. 101, May 9, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter
TFEU].
6. Article 1 of the 2007 Act also refers to the importance of protecting “the public
interest,” and [promoting] the healthy development of the socialist market economy”
(as well as “protection of fair market competition, enhancing economic efficiency,
maintaining the consumer interests”). The Authors shall use the term “public interest”
to include references to the terms “public interest,” “social public interest” and “the
interests of the society as a whole” as terms that have been used in various official
translations to describe the public interest within the meaning of Article 1 of the 2007
Act. In the original Chinese version, Article 1 refers to “the social public interest.” See
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fanlongduanfa (中华⼈⺠共和国反垄断法) [The AntiMonopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), art. 1, 2007 STANDING COMM.
NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 68 (referring to “the social public interest” and
“safeguarding the interests of consumers and social public interest,” and explaining that
“[t]his Law is enacted for the purpose of preventing and curbing monopolistic conducts,
protecting fair market competition, enhancing economic efficiency, maintaining the
consumer interests and the public interest, and promoting the healthy development of the
socialist market economy”); COMPETITION LAW IN CHINA: LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND
CASES A-1 (Peter J. Wang, Sébastien J. Evrard, Yizhe Zhang & Baohui Zhang eds., 2014)
(stating that Article 1 of the 2007 Act is enacted for the purposes of “protecting the
consumers and public interests . . . .”).
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protection of competition has status akin to the “rule of law”7,
China’s approach to competition appears different. Therefore,
this Article seeks to make a contribution to the important
question of whether China has accepted the introduction of
competition philosophy into its economy at all, and suggests
proposals for reform should China wish to move in a more procompetition direction.
To address this question, Part II of this Article will consider
the different meanings in China and the European Union of the
“public interest.” Part III will explain case studies8 undertaken by
the Authors in several China industries9 in order to illustrate how
public interest considerations (in the form of industrial policy
priorities) frequently defeat adherence to competition norms,
and compare how such practices would be treated under
European Union competition law. Part IV considers what reforms
are needed in order to elevate the enforcement of competition
law to become a key priority in China. In Part V the Authors
present conclusions.
II. VARYING UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE NOTION OF
“PUBLIC INTEREST” IN CHINA AND EUROPEAN UNION
COMPETITION LAW REGIMES
A. China’s Public Interest Approach: What Could it Mean?
While Article 1 of the 2007 Act posits safeguarding the
“public interest” in China as one of the four major objectives10 of
7. See discussion infra Part III.
8. Because China’s economy is one where frequent State intervention is a regular
occurrence, the Authors opted to use the case study method as a useful approach to study
how competition ideals are frequently disregarded in China to the detriment of private
businesses, and in favor of State monopolies. Examples include forcing privately-owned
steel mills to merge with their State-owned competitors in the China steel industry; or
discriminatory reduction of gasoline fuel supplies to privately-owned gasoline retailers
by State-owned refineries, with preference given to State-owned gasoline retailer
competitors; or margin-squeezing, discriminatory pricing, or denial of access on equal
terms, to privately-owned broadband suppliers to broadband infrastructure. This
contrasts with the favorable treatment of State-owned broadband suppliers.
9. The Authors selected the gasoline retail, telecom, and steel industries because of
their strategic interest to the national economy in China.
10 . The other three objectives listed in Article 1 are “protecting fair market
competition, enhancing economic efficiency, and maintaining the consumer interests.”
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fanlongduanfa (中华⼈⺠共和国反垄断法) [The Anti-
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the 2007 Law, there is no consensus in the literature as to its true
meaning. The meaning of “public interest” among academics
writing on the subject varies widely.11 Some scholars maintain that
the pursuit of the State’s industrial policy 12 is the “public
interest”, particularly in the context of achieving the hyperdevelopment of the Chinese economy.13 For others, the “public
interest” should mean reconciling the competing interests of the
State, market participants, and consumers, with the public
interest being achieved when there is harmony between these
competing interests. 14 Others take another view, arguing that
while the concept is simultaneously vague and flexible,15 it may be
difficult for antitrust regulators to choose between the public
interest and consumer welfare, because they may not be in
alignment with each other. 16 This could frustrate the
Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), art. 1, 2007 STANDING COMM.
NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 68.
11. See Weiping Ye, China’s Choice of Analytical Models for Its Anti-Monopoly Law, 39
SOC. SCI. CHINA 34 (2018); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Towards a Broader View of Competition Policy,
in COMPETITION POLICY FOR THE NEW ERA: INSIGHTS FROM THE BRICS COUNTRIES 4, 20,
(Tembinkosi Bonakele, Eleanor Fox & Liberty Mncube eds., 2017); Daniel C.K. Chow,
China’s Enforcement of Its Anti-Monopoly Law and Risks to Multinational Companies, 14 SANTA
CLARA J. INT’L L. 99, 101-03 (2016); Fred S. McChesney, Michael Reksulak & William F.
Shughart II, Competition Policy in Public Choice Perspective, in 1 OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 147, 147-55 (Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol
eds., 2015); XIAOYE WANG, THE EVOLUTION OF CHINA’S ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW 161-67
(2014).
12. Margaret M. Pearson, State-Owned Business and Party-State Regulation in China’s
Modern Political Economy, in STATE CAPITALISM, INSTITUTIONAL ADAPTATION, AND THE
CHINESE MIRACLE 27, 28 (Barry Naughton & Kellee S. Tsai eds., 2015); D. Daniel Sokol,
Tensions Between Antitrust and Industry Policy, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1247 (2015); NIAMH
DUNNE, COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMIC REGULATION (2015); Joseph E. Stiglitz,
Government Failure vs. Market Failure: Principles of Regulation, in GOVERNMENT AND
MARKETS: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION 13, 35 (Edward J. Balleisen & David
A. Moss eds., 2012).
13. See Shouwen Zhang, Lun Jingjifa de Xiandaihua (论经济法的现代化) [Study on
the Modernity of Economic Law], in JINGJIFA LUNWEN XUANCUI ( 经 济 法 论 文 选 粹 )
[SELECTED PAPERS ON ECONOMIC LAW] 158 (Law Press, 2004) (China).
14. See generally Jing Wang, A Maze of Contradictions: Chinese Law and Policy in the
Development Process of Privately Owned Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in China, 25 MICH.
ST. INT’L L. REV. 491, 552 (2017); Yane Svetiev & Lei Wang, Competition Law Enforcement
in China: Between Technocracy and Industrial Policy, 79 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 187, 198-99
(2016).
15. See Ariel Ezrachi, Sponge, 5 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 49, 56-7 (2017); WANG,
supra note 11, at 351-52.
16. See WANG, supra note 11, at 323. Horton goes further, stating: “There should be
little doubt that broad macroeconomic concerns are given priority over competition
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achievement of national competition objectives set out in the
2007 Act17, and its presence in the Act is reflective of an older
political culture that is lagging behind China’s progress toward a
market economy. 18 Others say that the “public interest” is
equivalent to consumer welfare. 19 In summary, there is no
consensus in the current literature on the subject. The debate in
the disparate literature addresses the issue on an almost
philosophical level, looking at legislative texts, rather than actual
outcomes.
In an attempt to answer this question, this Article takes a
different approach: in order to understand what the public
interest means in China, and its position among the hierarchy of
typical competition norms China proclaims to protect 20 , the
concerns in China today.” See Thomas J. Horton, Antitrust or Industrial Protectionism?:
Emerging International Issues in China’s Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Efforts, 14 SANTA
CLARA J. INT’L L. 109, 127 (2016).
17 . Article 1 provides that the Act seeks to prevent and restrain monopolistic
conduct, protect fair competition in the market, enhance economic efficiency, safeguard
the interests of consumers and the social public interest, and promote the healthy
development of the socialist market economy. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Fanlongduanfa (中华⼈⺠共和国反垄断法) [The Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30,
2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), art. 1, 2007 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ.
68 (China).
18. See generally Xiaoye Wang, Six Severe Challenges in Implementing China’s AntiMonopoly Law, 14 COMP. POL’Y INT’L 1 (2018); Angela Huyue Zhang, Strategic Public
Shaming: Evidence from Chinese Antitrust, 238 CHINA Q. 1 (2019); Jingyuan Ma & Mel
Marquis, Business Culture in East Asia and Implications for Competition Law, 51 TEX. INT’L
L.J. 1, 18 (2016); Nicholas Calcina Howson, Protecting the State from Itself?, in REGULATING
THE VISIBLE HAND?: THE INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE STATE CAPITALISM 49
(Benjamin L. Liebman & Curtis J. Milhaupt eds., 1st ed. 2015).
19. Wuzhen Jiang, Fanlongduanfa Zhongde Gonggong Liyi Jiqi Shixian (反垄断法中的
公 共 利 益 及 其 实 现 ) [The Public Interest in the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law and its
Implementation], 4 ZHONGWAI FAXUE (中外法学) PEKING U. L.J. 551 (2010) (pointing out
“反垄断法中公共利益的界定应该在与《宪法》所保护的公民的生存权、安全权、私有
财产权等不抵触的情况下，突出以“保护与增进消费者福利”为中心价值而形成反垄断法
中的公共利益” which translates as meaning that although the public interest concept
has a necessarily different focus under China’s Constitution in various contexts, e.g.,
right to life, right to security, right to property, etc., it is the protection and promotion
of consumer welfare that equates to the public interest value in the AML context). For a
discussion of public interest in developing countries, see Antonio Capobianco & Aranka
Nagy, Public Interest Clauses in Developing Countries, 7 J. E. COMP. L. & PRAC. 46 (2016). It
is noteworthy that recent reform proposals put forward by China’s antitrust body, SAMR,
do not elaborate on what is meant by the public interest concept. Draft (for public
comment) on the Amendment of the Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 of China, supra note 4.
20. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fanlongduanfa (中华⼈⺠共和国反垄断法)
[The Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the
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Authors’ case studies (detailed in Part III below) will examine
anti-competitive occurrences in several key industries. The
Authors’ studies come to a clear conclusion: the public interest
concept in the 2007 Act means that practices in China are
acceptable notwithstanding their often clear contravention of
competition objectives (namely consumer welfare, economic
efficiency, and fair competition).21 The evidence cited in support
of this claim in Part III below will clearly show that, time after
time, the State has advanced policies and practices that allow
State-Owned Enterprises (“SOEs”)—enterprises funded, owned
or controlled by different levels of the Chinese government) to
engage in transactions or activities that not only fail to achieve some
kind of harmony between the competing interests, but instead
exclusively advance the commercial interests of SOEs, often to the
detriment of fair competition, efficiency and consumer welfare.22
B. Contrast with the European Union Approach
This approach can be contrasted with the significantly
different approach taken in the European Union both in the
general competition field, and also in the market concentration
(i.e., merger control) field. First, in the general competition
arena, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(“TFEU”) Articles 101 and 102 23 assess the legality of antiStanding Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), art. 1, 2007
STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 68 (China). (“This Law is enacted for the
purpose of preventing and restraining monopolistic conducts, protecting fair market
competition, enhancing economic efficiency, safeguarding the interests of consumers
and the interests of the society as a whole, and promoting the healthy development of
socialist market economy.”).
21. All are mentioned as key objectives to be safeguarded under Article 1 of the
2007 Act. Id.
22. The Chinese government prefers to develop SOEs as a matter of priority. See,
e.g., Lei Zheng et al., SOEs and State Governance, in REGULATING THE VISIBLE HAND?: THE
INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE STATE CAPITALISM 203 (Benjamin L. Liebman
& Curtis J. Milhaupt eds., 1st ed. 2015); Ines Willemyns, Disciplines on State-Owned
Enterprises in International Economic Law: Are we moving in the right direction?, 19 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 657, 679 (2016); Curtis J. Milhaupt & Wentong Zheng, Beyond Ownership: State
Capitalism and the Chinese Firm, 103 GEO. L.J. 665, 668 (2015).
23. TFEU, supra note 5, arts. 101-102. TFEU Article 101 prohibits all agreements
between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings, and concerted
practices which may affect trade between European Union Member States and which
have as their object or effect, the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition
within the European Internal Market. However, exemption from the prohibition is
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competitive agreements24 or abuses of dominance25 by way of a
competition compatibility test. 26 There are no explicit public
interest criteria (nor industrial policy criteria27) in the European
Union competition compatibility test that can be used to justify
State action departing from competition norms.28 The only way
possible where it can be demonstrated that the production or distribution of goods is
improved, or technical or economic progress is promoted; that consumers benefit, and
that the possibility of eliminating competition with respect to a substantial part of the
products in question will likely not occur. TFEU Article 102 prohibits any abuse by one
or more undertakings of a dominant position within the Internal Market or in a
substantial part of it. This is prohibited insofar as it may affect trade between Member
States. Unlike practices that breach art. 101, there is no equivalent exemption for abuses
contrary to art. 102—they cannot be exempted. See id.
24. TFEU, supra note 5, art. 101.
25. Id. art. 102.
26. In short, (as per TFEU Articles 101-102) the European Union competition
compatibility test is whether the anti-competitive agreement or alleged abuse of
dominance adversely affects competition in a substantial part of the European Union.
See id. arts. 101-102.
27. For example, attempts to invoke industrial policy considerations as a ground to
justify mergers are not usually acceptable to the European Commission. See Case M.8677,
Siemens / Alstom, Comm’n Decision, 2019 O.J. (C 300) [hereinafter Siemens / Alstom].
For criticisms of this approach, see BRUNO DEFFAINS ET AL., COMPETITION POLICY AND
INDUSTRIAL POLICY: FOR A REFORM OF EUROPEAN LAW, ROBERT SCHUMAN FOUNDATION
1 (2020); Ioannis Lianos, The Future of Competition Policy in Europe – Some Reflections on the
Interaction between Industrial Policy and Competition Law, 5 COMP. L. INT’L (2019).
Notwithstanding the criticisms, the European Commission has been very clear that a
European Union State’s national industrial policy should not be used to justify mergers
since its very first Merger control prohibition decision in 1991. See Case IV/M.53,
Aerospatiale-Alenia / De Havilland, Comm’n Decision, 1991 O.J. (L 334) 42 [hereinafter
Aerospatiale-Alenia / De Havilland]. This attracted the ire of both the UK and France
when the Commission prohibited the takeover of a failing aerospace firm (De Havilland)
on competition grounds and would not allow it to proceed on industrial policy grounds,
because the test for merger approval is a purely competition-based test. However, the
Commission appeared to relax its position somewhat in the subsequent Case IV/M.308,
Kali-Salz /MdK / Treuhand, Comm’n Decision, 1994 O.J. (L 186) 38 [hereinafter KaliSalz / MdK / Treuhand], finding that it could consider industrial policy considerations
if three criteria were satisfied: (1) the failing firm must be in imminent danger of being
forced out of the market because of financial difficulties if not taken over by another
undertaking; (2) there is no less anti-competitive alternative than the proposed takeover,
and (3) in the absence of a merger, the assets of the failing firm would inevitably exit the
market, nevertheless the Commission made it clear that its starting point is that absent
such considerations, it will not consider factors unrelated to competition.
28 . Brook asserts that there are public policy considerations applied by the
European Commission in the sense that it sets institutional priorities (as to which
competition cases it will and will not investigate). This perspective does not mean that
the Commission applies a public interest test, and indeed no such test appears in either
TFEU articles 101 or 102. See, e.g., Or Brook, Priority Setting as A Double-Edged Sword: How
Modernization Strengthened the Role of Public Policy, 14 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 1 (2020). Brook
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that competition norms can be relegated to the sideline by the
State in the European Union sphere, is where it can be
demonstrated that the contested activity is either a non-economic
activity pursued by the State (or its nominees) in the exercise of
the State’s “official authority” (e.g., monitoring pollution,29 data
privacy,30 collecting taxation,31 etc.), or, where the activity (even
if economic in nature) is intrinsically linked to some official
authority activity or social solidarity-enhancing activity that is, in
itself, non-economic in nature.32 On the other hand, where anticompetitive arrangements have no such “official authority”
flavor, then they are subject to the rigors of competition law. This
means that anti-competitive agreements between enterprises are
prohibited, but can be eligible for exemption from the prohibition
in TFEU Article 101 if it can be demonstrated that they have
takes the view that when the European Commission sets its investigation enforcement
priorities, it is in effect making public policy decisions when deciding which cases it will
investigate. See id. However, this is far removed from the subject matter of this Article,
which focuses on the fact that China has a public interest test in its 2007 Act, whereas
European Union competition law does not.
29. See Case C-343/95, Diego Calí & Figli Srl v. Servizi Ecologici Porto di Genova
SpA, 1997 E.C.R. I-1580 [hereinafter Diego Calí]. In Diego Calí, the Court of Justice of
the European Union (“CJEU” or “Court of Justice”) held that the collection of fees to
pay for anti-pollution monitoring surveillance was not an economic activity, as it was
intrinsically linked with an exercise of official authority (anti-pollution monitoring) to
protect the public interest in maintaining a safe environment. See id. For a discussion of
environmental protection, see Suzanne Kingston, Competition Law in an Environmental
Crisis, 9 J. EUR. COMP. L. & PRAC. 517 (2019).
30 . See Case C-238/05, Asnef-Equifax, v. Asociación de Usuarios de Servicios
Bancarios (Ausbanc), 2006 E.C.R. I-11145 ¶ 63 (stating that “[a]ny possible issues
relating to the sensitivity of personal data are not, as such, a matter for competition law
. . . .”). On data privacy, see John M. Newman, Antitrust in Digital Markets, 72 VAND. L.
REV. 1497 (2019); Ariel Ezrachi, EU Competition Law Goals and the Digital Economy, 17
OXFORD LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER (2018).
31. See Case C-207/01, Altair Chimica SpA v. ENEL Distribuzione SpA, 2003 E.C.R.
I-8894 [hereinafter Altair Chimica]. In Altair Chimica, the CJEU held that the collection
of taxes could not be regarded as an economic activity, but instead was a manifestation
of the exercise of official authority. Any anti-competitive impact therefore did not arise
as a result of the autonomous actions of a market operator; rather, it resulted from the
dictates of the legislator governing tax collection. See id.
32. In Case T-319/99, Federación Española de Empresas de Tecnología Sanitaria
(“FENIN”) v. Eur. Comm’n, 2003 E.C.R. II-357, the General Court of the European
Union held that the purchase of hospital equipment for Spanish public hospitals,
although ostensibly a commercial transaction, could not be viewed as an end in itself.
Instead the end was the pursuit of social solidarity in providing properly equipped public
hospitals. The purchasing activity was not within the ambit of competition law, even
though it had anti-competitive (monopoly) features. See Niamh Dunne, Public Interest and
EU Competition Law, 65 ANTITRUST BULL. 256, 262 (2020).
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substantial pro-economic/pro-consumer welfare effects, and not
(unlike China) because the pursuit of some particular State
industrial policy is desired.33 Apart from those situations, it is not
possible for the European Union Member States to permit or
promote otherwise anti-competitive practices “in the public
interest”, because there is no such exception contained in either
the European Union Treaties or within secondary legislation.
Such limited exceptions, namely the aforementioned official
authority or social solidarity exceptions, have been created by the
European Court of Justice in its case law, and are governed by
rigorous conditions before disregard for competition law is
acceptable.34 By contrast, the case studies in Part III will illustrate
the contrast with China, as they shall demonstrate how adherence
to fundamental competition norms (such as non-discriminatory
treatment of suppliers or abusive leverage of upstream
dominance in downstream markets) is often cast aside, in favor of
the “public interest”, thereby posing harm for competition,
competitors, and ultimately consumers.
Second, another major departure between the European
Union and China’s regime can be seen in their respective
approaches to controlling market concentration. The primary
test of compatibility of a merger with a community dimension35
33. So far as TFEU Article 102 (prohibition of abuses of dominance) is concerned,
there is no legal ability to permit abuses of dominance in European Union Law. While
Article 6 of China’s 2007 Act contains a similar prohibition, a point of distinction
between the two systems is that although China’s 2007 Act prohibits abuses of dominance
on its face, in practice the State does frequently permit such abuses to take place. See TFEU,
supra note 5, art. 102; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fanlongduanfa (中华⼈⺠共和国
反垄断法) [The Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated
by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), art.
6, 2007 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 68 (China). For case studies which
exhibit such examples, see infra Part III (e.g., the fixed broadband access case study will
show how margin squeezing is tolerated in China even though it makes market entry
unattractive to private downstream competitors, and harms consumers). See id.
34. See Case T-216/15, Dôvera zdravotná poistʼovňa v. Comm’n,
ECLI:EU:T:2018:64 (2018); Case T-138/15, Aanbestedingskalender v. Eur. Comm’n,
ECLI:EU:T:2017:675 (2017); Altair Chimica, supra note 31; Diego Calí, supra note 29;
Case C-475/99, Ambulanz Glöckner v. Landkreis Südwestpfalz, 2001 E.C.R. I-8137; Case
C-364/92, SAT Fluggesellschaft mbH v. Eur. Org. for the Safety of Air Navigation
(Eurocontrol), 1994 E.C.R. I-55.
35 . Council Regulation 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of
concentrations between undertakings, arts. 1, 4, 2004 O.J. (L 24) 6, 8 (EC) [hereinafter
EC Merger Regulation]. This European Union Regulation obliges merging parties to
notify the European Union Commission of a proposed merger for prior approval where
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in the European Union is whether the merger will significantly
adversely affect competition in the Internal Market, 36 with
Member States only free to “interfere” with a proposed merger in
a limited number of narrowly defined non-competition situations,
in defense of what are known as “legitimate interests.”37 This is a
very different approach from the China approach:38 the Part III
case studies will show how pursuit of the public interest promotes
many forced mergers in China, notwithstanding the resulting
diminution of competition. 39 It is clear that mergers are
the proposed merger (“concentration”) has a “Community dimension.” A
concentration has a “Community dimension” when the parties possess either (1) a
combined turnover of more than EU€5 billion worldwide, with at least two of the
merging entities having a European Union turnover of more than EU€250 million each,
in different Member States; or (2) concentrations with a EU€2.5 billion turnover
worldwide, and significant turnover in at least 3 European Union Member States, etc.).
For further turnover test specificity, see id. art. 1.
36. The EC Merger Regulation, art. 2, provides the concentration appraisal test. A
concentration which does not significantly impede effective competition in the common
market or in a substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or
strengthening of a dominant position, shall be declared compatible with the common
market. A concentration which would significantly impede effective competition, in
particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, shall be
declared incompatible. See EC Merger Regulation, supra note 35, art. 2.
37. The 3 legitimate interests explicitly mentioned in art. 21(4) MCR are: public
security, plurality of the media, or prudential interests. See EC Merger Regulation, supra
note 35. Such “legitimate interests” can be used to justify Member State intervention in
the national elements of a proposed merger on non-competition grounds, but the State
has no competence to regulate the European Union competition aspects of the merger
(that remains with the Commission). See Bruce Lyons et al., UK Competition Policy PostBrexit: Taking Back Control While Resisting Siren Calls, 5 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 1, 10,
11, 32 (2017); JONATHAN PARKER & ADRIAN MAJUMDAR, UK MERGER CONTROL 145-48
(Hart Publ’g, 2d ed. 2016); see generally RICCARDO CELLI ET AL., CORPORATE
ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (Wolters Kluwer Law & Bus., 1st
ed. 2014); IOANNIS KOKKORIS & HOWARD SHELANSKI, EU MERGER CONTROL: AN
ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS (Oxford Univ. Press, 1st ed. 2014).
38. DEFFAINS ET AL., supra note 27, at 14-15 (pointing out that “China supports its
national champions without constraint”). See also Guowuyuan Guanyu Jingyingzhe
Jizhong Shenbao Biaozhun de Guiding (国务 院关 于经 营者 集中 申报 标准 的规 定 )
[Provisions of the State Council on Thresholds for Prior Notification of Concentrations
of Undertakings] (promulgated by the 20th Executive Meeting of the State Council, Aug.
1, 2008, effective Aug. 1, 2008) ST. COUNCIL GAZ., Mar. 2, 2009, at 1-2. Article 3 of the
Provisions obliges merging parties in China that satisfy large financial thresholds to notify
to the Ministry of Commerce for prior approval. See id. For specific information on the
size of the turnover thresholds, see id. art. 3. Article 4 provides that mergers that do not
reach these Article 3 turnover thresholds can still be investigated by the competent
commerce department of the State Council and prohibited if they adversely affect, or
are likely to affect, the elimination or restriction of competition in China. See id. art. 4.
39. See infra Part III.
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encouraged in China, ostensibly on the grounds that they are not
anti-competitive,40 but in reality they advance the achievement of
the State’s industrial policy. For example, certain industries such
as the steel and gasoline station industries are consolidated, by
allowing SOEs take over private competitors, often to the
detriment of competition.41 This is in contrast to the European
Union, where only a significant reduction in competition, not the
public interest,42 is the compatibility test for mergers. Such anticompetitive mergers are not permitted to proceed on
competition grounds, and they certainly cannot be permitted on
grounds that they in some way advance State industrial policy43 or
on the basis of any other State consideration such as the public
interest.
While the EC Merger Regulation (“MCR”) does provide a
procedure whereby if a Member State has concerns about a
40. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fanlongduanfa (中华⼈⺠共和国反垄断法)
[The Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), art. 28,
2007 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 68 (China). Where a concentration
has or may have the effect of eliminating or restricting competition, the Anti-Monopoly
Authority via the State Council makes a decision to prohibit the concentration. However,
if the business operators involved can prove that the concentration will bring more
positive impact than negative impact on competition, or that the concentration is in
public interest, the Anti-Monopoly Authority may decide not to prohibit the
concentration. Id. art. 29. Where the concentration is not prohibited, the Anti-Monopoly
Authority may decide to attach restrictive conditions for reducing the negative impact of
such concentration on competition. Id. art. 30. Where the Anti-Monopoly Authority
decides to prohibit a concentration or attaches restrictive conditions to the
concentration, it must publicize the prohibition/attachment to the general public in
timely manner.
41. See infra Part III (explaining the case studies on the Steel and Filling Stations
sectors). For a description of China’s approach, see Mark Furse, Evidencing the Goals of
Competition Law in the People’s Republic of China: Inside the Merger Laboratory, 41 WORLD
COMP. L. & ECON. REV. 129, 168 (2018) (pointing out that merger control in China links
industrial policy and national economic development).
42 . For example, unlike China, in the European Union the pursuit of noncompetition objectives, such as industrial policy, is not part of the merger clearance test.
See generally Siemens / Alstom, supra note 27. The European Commission prohibited
Siemens (German) merging with Alstom (French) due to the foreseeable reduction in
competition in the high-speed trains production market and was unwilling to consider
arguments seeking to justify the merger on non-competition industrial policy grounds,
as the merger clearance test in the European Union is a purely competition-based test.
See id.
43. See Aerospatiale-Alenia / De Havilland, supra note 27 (as early as 1991 the
European Commission made it clear that the merger compatibility test in the European
Union could not be based on a State’s industrial policy).
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proposed merger, the State can seek to interfere with it on noncompetition grounds to protect “legitimate interests,” 44 Member
States are only able to take action on such grounds where the
Member State can either advance a legitimate interest that is
explicitly mentioned in the MCR Article 21,45 or advance a new
legitimate interest ground that the European Commission is
prepared to accept 46 (and if the State does advance such
legitimate interests grounds, it is not for the purpose of seeking to
approve the merger on such grounds, but rather to inhibit some
element of the merger on non-competition grounds 47 ). It is clear
44. See EC Merger Regulation, supra note 35. Art. 21(4) provides that Member
States may take appropriate measures to protect legitimate interests other than those set
out in the Regulation, provided any such newly proposed legitimate interests are
compatible with the General Principles of European Union Law. Public security, plurality
of the media, and prudential rules are listed as legitimate interests within the meaning
of Article 21. Article 21 leaves the way open for recognition of new legitimate interests,
proposed by the Member States to the European Commission from time to time, with
their acceptance depending on the agreement of the Commission and compliance with
the foregoing requirements. See id.
45. The 3 legitimate interests explicitly mentioned in MCR art. 21(4) are public
security, plurality of the media, and prudential interests. See id. art. 21(4).
46. MCR art. 21(4) also provides that any proposed new public interest advanced
by a Member State must be communicated to the Commission and must be recognized
by the Commission after an assessment of its compatibility with the general principles
and other provisions of Community law, before the measures referred to above may be
taken. See EC Merger Regulation, supra note 35, art. 21(4). See Case C-42/01, Portuguese
Republic v. Comm’n, 2004 E.C.R. I-06079 [hereinafter Portuguese Republic] (The CJEU
held that Portugal had erred in not giving the Commission the opportunity to consider
whether to recognize a new legitimate interest in a case where Portugal took steps to
prevent the takeover of a cement producer in which the State had an interest, by a
Swiss/Portuguese consortium, on economic policy grounds. The Court did not accept
that a new legitimate interest had been advanced by the Member State. It held that the
State was obliged to notify the use of art. 21(4) to the Commission in order to give the
Commission the opportunity to consider the proposal by the Member State (Portugal)
to invoke a new legitimate interest).
47. Such legitimate interests can be used to justify Member State intervention in a
merger on non-competition grounds, but the State has no competence to regulate the
European Union competition aspects of the merger (that remains with the Commission).
See EC Merger Regulation, supra note 35, art. 21(4); see Case IV/M.336, IBM France v.
CGI, Comm’n Decision, 1993 O.J. (C 151) 5 (invoking art. 21(4) for the first time, and
invoking “public security” as a legitimate interest); see XXIIIrd Report on Competition Policy
1993, COM (Mar. 26, 1995), https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail//publication/7db4a243-39f3-4ba4-a5b7-1cb48f8ca6d3
[https://perma.cc/WZ3WPKM7]; see Case IV/M.423, Newspaper Publishing, Comm’n Decision, 1994 O.J. (C 85)
5 (approving a proposed concentration in the UK newspaper industry, accepting that
the UK separately could take steps under its own domestic media legislation to protect
its own domestic legitimate interests, namely measures to protect the plurality of the UK
media sector); see Case M.759, Sun Alliance v. Royal Ins., Comm’n Decision, 1996 O.J.
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therefore, that the MCR Article 21 legitimate interests concept is
in no way analogous to the “public interest” concept found in
China’s 2007 Act:48 the European Union’s “legitimate interests”
and China’s “public interest” concepts serve totally opposite
purposes. In the European Union, legitimate interests cannot
serve a State’s domestic industrial policy aims, whereas in China
the public interest concept clearly does. 49 By maintaining the
supremacy of competition as the test of legality, it is clear that in
the European Union merger clearance system, it is only on
competition grounds that mergers can proceed—with non-competition
grounds (“legitimate interests”) being used only to regulate or
prohibit the non-competition aspects of major mergers. The
European Union’s legitimate interests concept is therefore
inconsistent with the “public interest” concept, which China
relies on, to approve the entire transaction in itself,
notwithstanding its adverse impact on competition.
III. THE SECTORAL CASE STUDIES AND METHODOLOGY
Owing to the specific history of the Chinese economy’s
development, 50 the State has become accustomed to using

(C 225) 12 (accepting that the UK could apply its own domestic insurance legislation to
a proposed concentration). Case IV/M.1346, EdF v. London Electricity, Comm’n
Decision, 1999 O.J. (4064) 89 (an example of the Commission recognizing that Member
States were acting in pursuit of legitimate interests). Member State claims that they need
to take steps to protect legitimate interests are not always accepted. See, e.g., Case
IV/M.161, BSCH v. Champaliaud, Comm’n Decision, 1999 O.J. (C 306) 37 (rejecting the
argument that Portugal had established a legitimate interest to interfere with a takeover
of one of its major banks). In Portuguese Republic, supra note 46, the Court of Justice
did not accept that Portugal has advanced a new legitimate interest. Finally, for an
example of where the Commission cleared a merger at European Union level but a
Member State (the United Kingdom) prohibited it at national level on art. 21 (legitimate
interest) grounds, see Case COMP/M.5932, News Corp v. BSkyB, Comm’n Decision,
2011 O.J. (C 37) 5.
48. As the three case studies in Part III will each demonstrate, China permits
transactions to proceed even though they have anti-competitive effects; whereas in the
European Union the concept of legitimate interests is (1) narrowly defined, and (2)
rarely invoked by Member States, as the European Union’s policy is that competition
(not national interests) should be the main parameter against which major mergers are
assessed. See infra Part III.
49. See infra Part III.
50. After practicing a “Planned Economy Model” for more than 30 years from 1952,
starting in 1978 China spent many years transforming into the “Market Economy
Model.” The Central Government asserted that the State should pay more attention to

624 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:3

administrative directions and State industrial policy to prime its
economic development approach. In the absence of a westernstyle separation of powers judicial model and the lack of a
significant body of accessible domestic competition
jurisprudence in China, the case study method is regarded as a
reliable method to demonstrate how competition ideals are
frequently disregarded in favor of State monopoly administrative
action. In the three sectoral case studies, the Authors seek to
ascertain whether the enactment of the 2007 Act had any impact
on altering this historical approach.
In order to conduct the case studies for the purpose of
observing the evolving elements of the State’s industrial policy
and whether the 2007 Act’s protection-of-competition stance had
any impact on the State’s traditional approach, the Authors
selected three sectors for analysis in different regions in China:
the filling station sector in Beijing, Guangzhou,51 and Cangzhou;52
the fixed-broadband sector in Beijing, Cangzhou, and Jimo;53 and
the steel sector in Hebei province. These sectors were chosen
because they have a history of intervention which has continued
past the adoption of the 2007 Act. Research for this field exercise
was carried out by way of semi-structured interviews conducted in
several cities across China; surveys were also conducted in the
market mechanisms and the competitive order. See generally XIAOJING ZHANG & XIN
CHANG, THE LOGIC OF ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA (2016).
51. Guangzhou (广州), is the capital of Guangdong Province (广东省). It is the largest
city in the south-eastern part of China, with a population of some 15.3 million people,
and covers a total area of 7,434 square kilometres. See Guangzhou Gaikuang (广州概况)
[Guangzhou Overview], GUANGZHOU MUN. CULTURE, RADIO, TELEVISION & TOURISM
BUREAU
(Jan.
29,
2021),
http://wglj.gz.gov.cn/wlzx/hsgz/gzgk/index.html
[https://perma.cc/26PT-7N9F].
52. Cangzhou (沧州), a city in north-eastern part China in Hebei Province (河北省),
has a population of 7.54 million people and covers an area of 14,304 square kilometres.
See Cangzhou Gaikuang: Ziran Dili ( 沧州概况 : 自然地理 ) [Cangzhou Overview: Physical
Geography],
CANGZHOU
GOV’T
(Mar.
6,
2020),
http://www.cangzhou.gov.cn/zjcz/czgk/dllz/index.shtml
[https://perma.cc/T56CAZRC]; Cangzhou Gaikuang: Renkou Minzu (沧州概况 : 人口民族 ) [Cangzhou Overview:
Population and Ethnic Groups], CANGZHOU GOV’T (Mar. 27, 2020),
http://www.cangzhou.gov.cn/zjcz/czgk/rkymc/index.shtml [https://perma.cc/GS2RXPMU].
53. Jimo (即墨) is a county-level city in the north-eastern part of China, in Shandong
Province (山东省). This city has nearly 1.25 million people and covers a total area of 1,780
square kilometres. See Jimo Gaikuang ( 即墨概况 ) [Jimo Overview], JIMO GOVT’ (2020),
http://www.jimo.gov.cn/n3204/n3217/191127174547027163.html
[https://perma.cc/9V3D-M4K7].
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filling station industry case study. The objective was to obtain
factual data, and to examine the genuine attitudes of SOEs and
private enterprises towards the public interest and the 2007 Act.
Separately, the Authors also interviewed leading professors
on a series of questions based around whether the 2007 Act
provides sufficient protection for private enterprises against
encroachment or restriction by SOEs and administrative agencies
of their economic activities. 54 Chinese antitrust enforcement
agency staff were not interviewed because they could not receive
permission to be interviewed, but a number were interviewed
informally at conferences, and provided helpful observations.
A. What the Case Studies Reveal
Although the 2007 Act proclaims that the Anti-Monopoly
Law of China 2007 was enacted with the objective of preventing
and restraining monopolistic conduct on, inter alia, “public
interest” grounds, the Authors’ case studies below will
demonstrate that in reality, when the Chinese authorities
consider this question in the context of the activities of SOEs in
several key industries in China, the meaning of public interest
clearly accommodates actions that are antithetical to the Act’s
proclaimed competition objectives, namely “protecting fairness of
competition”,
“enhancing
economic
efficiency”,
and
“safeguarding the interests of consumers”. 55 Examples will be
discussed below, emanating from different sectors of the Chinese
economy, 56 where either mergers or the acquisition of
dominance or anti-competitive market practices were not only
permitted, but also actively encouraged to proceed,
54. In general, these six professors’ responses exhibited strong symmetry. Their
responses can be summarized as follows: (1) The provisions of the 2007 Act in their
current form are unable to prevent inappropriate administrative intervention against
privately-owned small and medium-sized enterprises, which is partially caused by the
State’s industrial policy; (2) The State’s industrial policy is pre-eminent, rather than the
2007 Act; (3) The multi-agency system in China wastes enforcement resources and lacks
effective functionality (note that the Chinese antitrust enforcement agency has been
upgraded recently (2018), though efficacy concerns still remain). See Chart 2, infra note
155; see infra Section IV.B.2.
55. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fanlongduanfa (中华⼈⺠共和国反垄断法)
[The Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), art. 1, 2007
STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 68 (China).
56. See infra Part III (discussing Filling Stations, Fixed-Broadband, and Steel Mills).
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notwithstanding their detriment to efficiency, consumer welfare,
or fair competition.57
Indeed, these case studies will furnish evidence to
demonstrate how SOEs, facilitated by domestic SOE-biased
industrial policies,58 have engaged in market practices which work
against the very notion of competition, to the detriment of both
competitors and consumer welfare. In other words, the sectors
the Authors examine reveal that SOEs’ steps to achieve market
dominance/monopoly by way of exclusionary practices or forced
concentration, are not regarded as being contrary to the public
interest, nor are they regarded as detrimental to economic
efficiency, consumer welfare, or competitors. Subjecting the
public interest concept to assessment against these three criteria
in the sectoral case studies demonstrates that in each instance,
the public interest which any one of these three objectives might
be assumed to promote, was disregarded in favor of advancement
of SOE’s monopolistic or exclusionary behavior. This outcome
seems to be at odds with the common international
understanding of the wider public interest concept in the
competition regulation context,59 and raises the key question of
57. The Authors’ research, set out in the case studies below, finds convincing
evidence which leads the Authors to conclude that the concept is an empty formula in a
protection of competition context, i.e., the “public interest” appears to be ineffective
when it comes to regulating activities which achieve the advancement or attainment of
dominance by SOEs over private enterprises in China.
58. The following State policies, known as “Plans,” apply in the Filling Station,
Telecoms, and Steel Production sectors, and still affect the relevant sectors’ structure:
(1) Filling Stations: Guanyu Qingli Zhengdun Xiaolianyouchang he Guifan Yuanyou
Chengpinyou Liutong Zhixu de Yijian (关于清理整顿成品油流通企业和规范成品油流通
秩序的实施意见) [On the Liquidating and Restructuring of the Small Oil Refining
Factories and Standardizing the Circulation Order of Crude Oil and Petroleum
Products] [hereinafter Order No. 38 of 1999] (promulgated by the SETC, the Ministry
of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (“MOFTE”), the St. Admin. for Industry
and Commerce (“SAIC”), the St. Admin. of Taxation (“SAT”) and the Quality and
Technical Supervision Bureau, July 7, 1999, effective July 7, 1999); (2) Telecoms: Guanyu
Guli he Yindao Minjian Ziben Jinyibu Jinru Dianxinye de Shishi Yijian (关于鼓励和引导
民间资本进一步进入电信业的实施意见) [Implementing Opinions to Encourage and
Guide Further Investment of Private Capital in the Telecommunications Industry]
(promulgated by the MIIT of China, June 28, 2012, effective June 28, 2012); (3) Steel
Industry: Guangyu Tuijin Gangtie Chanye Jianbing Chongzu Chuzhi Jiangshi Qiye
Gongzuo Fang’an (关于推进钢铁产业兼并重组处置僵尸企业工作方案) [Guiding
Opinions on Promoting the Merger and Reorganization of the Steel Industry to Manage
Zombie Enterprises] (promulgated by the St. Council of China, 2016, effective 2016).
59. For example, in European Union national legal systems, market behavior of
corporations is regulated by traditional competition norms such as consumer welfare
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whether the 2007 Act can ever be effective to protect competition
in China.
B. The Filling Station Case Study—The Promotion of Exclusionary
Conduct and Unfair Competition
Practices in the gasoline filling station industry in China
present an interesting laboratory for undertaking a case study.60
The concept of fair competition includes the notion that neither
the State nor its agencies should engage in unfair competition
against private sector competitors. European Union Law reflects
this in TFEU Article 10661 when it proclaims that State-appointed
services of general economic interest, or revenue-producing
monopolies, cannot use their State-appointed privileged position
to engage in acts that constitute a violation of European Union
competition law—unless European Union competition law’s
application would prevent them from fulfilling the core mission
entrusted to them by public law.62 By comparison, while it could
and economic efficiency. No longer can market practices or transactions such as mergers
be prohibited on national protectionist grounds based on the nebulous concept of
public interest.
60. This case study was undertaken on the filling station sector in Beijing (北京),
Guangzhou (广州), and Cangzhou (沧州), three cities of different sizes, all in different
provinces. Staff members working in oil refining SOEs were interviewed; questionnaires
were designed for privately-owned filling stations in specific areas in order to examine
the reality of their operating conditions as domestic privately-owned filling stations. This
gave good insight and better understanding of the attitudes of SOEs and the private
operators toward “oil shortages” (reductions in supply to filling stations caused by the
anti-competitive behavior of upstream oil refining SOEs). The survey of privately-owned
filling stations was very useful, revealing some interesting information. First, privatelyowned filling stations occupied less than 15% of all filling stations in the survey areas;
second, more than half of them have suffered from “oil shortages” since 2008; third,
most of them have faced operating challenges arising from the behavior of gasoline
SOEs, but most of them still try to remain in the market; fourth, although the State
released a policy, “Gasoline and Chemical Industry 12th Five-Year Development Plan" in
2011 to promote the growth of privately-owned filling stations, the private operators were
not optimistic that this would bring any genuinely positive change for the private sector.
61. TFEU, supra note 5, art. 106. See generally Grith Skovgaard Ølykke & Peter
Møllgaard, What is a service of general economic interest, 41 J.L. & ECON. 205 (2016); Gérard
Marćou, The Impact of EU Law on Local Public Service Provision: Competition and Public
Service, in PUBLIC AND SOCIAL SERVICES IN EUROPE: FROM PUBLIC AND MUNICIPAL TO
PRIVATE SECTOR PROVISION 13, 13-26 (Hellmut Wollmann, Ivan Koprić & Gérard Marćou
eds., 2016).
62. See generally TFEU supra note 5, art. 106; see also Case C-320/91, Corbeau, 1993
E.C.R. I-2533 [hereinafter Corbeau]; Case C-260/89, ERT v. DEP, 1991 E.C.R. I-2925;
Case C-179/90, Merci Convenzionali Porto di Genova v. Siderurgica Gabriella SpA, 1991
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be said that the position of China’s SOEs is somewhat less
constrained (by virtue of a combined reading of Articles 4, 5 and
7 of the 2007 Act63), nevertheless Article 5 of the 2007 Act does
require mergers (“concentrations”) to occur by means of “fair
competition”; Article 7 prohibits mergers from damaging the
interests of consumers by virtue of their dominant position or
exclusive appointment.64 A prime example of how these statutory
prohibitions have not been observed in practice in China is the
way in which, over the last decade, SOEs in China have engaged
in anti-competitive practices leading to the mass elimination of
privately-owned filling stations in cities around China.
At least two strategies have been deployed by SOEs in China
to eliminate private competition in the filling station industry by
the three major oil SOEs (Sinopec, PetroChina, and China
National Offshore Oil Corp) which occupy a joint dominant
position65 that is, in European Union terms, akin to a collectively

E.C.R. I-5889; Case C-18/88, RTT v. GB-INNO-BM SA, 1991 E.C.R. I-5973 [hereinafter
RTT]. For more on this issue, see Grith Skovgaard Ølykke, Exclusive Rights and State Aid,
16 EUR. ST. AID Q. 164 (2017); MARKET INTEGRATION AND PUBLIC SERVICE IN THE EU
(Marise Cremona ed., 2011); THE EU LAW OF COMPETITION ch. 6 (Jonathan Faull & Ali
Nikpay, eds., 3d ed. 2014).
63. The State shall make and implement competition rules which accord with the
socialist market economy, perfects macro-control, and advances a unified, open,
competitive and orderly market system. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fanlongduanfa
(中华⼈⺠共和国反垄断法) [The Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug.
1, 2008), art. 4, 2007 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 68 (China); Business
operators may, through fair competition or voluntary alliance, concentrate themselves
according to law, expand the scope of business operations, and enhance competitiveness.
[Authors’ note: “business operators” include SOEs]. Id. art. 5. With respect to the
industries controlled by the State-owned economy and concerning the lifeline of
national economy and national security or the industries implementing exclusive
operation and sales according to law, the State protects the lawful business operations
conducted by the business operators therein. The State also lawfully regulates and
controls their business operations and the prices of their commodities and services so as
to safeguard the interests of consumers and promote technical progresses. The business
operators as mentioned above shall operate lawfully, be honest and faithful, be strictly
self-disciplined, accept social supervision, and shall not damage the interests of
consumers by virtue of their dominant or exclusive positions. Id. art. 7.
64. Additionally, art. 8 of the 2007 Act prohibits the State’s administrative organs
from abusing their administrative powers to eliminate or restrict competition. See id. art.
8.
65. By the end of 2017, the number of Sinopec and PetroChina’s filling stations was
over 53% of all filling stations in China. See generally Angela Huyue Zhang, The Antitrust
Paradox of China Inc., 50 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 159 (2017).
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dominant position:66 Strategy One has been the practice of SOEs
preventing non-SOE (private) filling stations from being able to
react to international oil price changes on the garage forecourt
as promptly as SOE-owned filling stations could (SOE-owned
filling stations—unlike their privately-owned competitors—were
cushioned against the impact of input price rises via refining
subsidies granted to their parent oil refining operation); Strategy
Two involves SOEs’ restricting oil supplies to private filling
stations (creating so-called “oil shortages”), in order to
encourage their market exit.67 These strategies are antithetical to
fair competition; they adversely affect consumer welfare (by
elimination of private retail competitors); they are promoting the
extension of SOEs’ dominance from the production level down
to the retail level; and they inhibit efficiency enhancement by
forcing private owners’ market exit. Notwithstanding these
adverse impacts, the State tolerated this development. This means
that the public interest is clearly consonant with enhancing the
position of the oil SOEs, to the detriment of consumers and
competitors, which is the very antithesis of competition in the
classic sense.
1. Case Studies
This Section discusses two case studies to illustrate the
impact of these two strategies on competition. The first case study
demonstrates Strategy One (toleration of discriminatory pricing
practices that would not be tolerated in the European Union). In
the period between 1992-1998 there was rapid growth of privately-

66. The European Union Courts elaborate on the notion of collective dominance
in TFEU art. 102 cases such as: Joined Cases T-68,77&78/89, Societa Italiana Vetro SpA
v. Comm’n, 1992 E.C.R. II-1403; Joined Cases C-395 & 396/96P, Compagnie Mar. Belge
Transps. SA v. Comm’n, 2000 E.C.R. I-1365; Joined Cases T-191&212-214/98, Atl.
Container Line AB and Others v. Comm’n, 2003 E.C.R. II-3275; Case T-193/02, Laurent
Piau v. Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. II-209; Case T-228/97, Irish Sugar plc v. Comm’n, 1999
E.C.R. II-2969. The General Court of the European Union elaborates on the notion in
several EC Merger Regulation cases: Case T-102/96, Gencor Ltd v. Comm’n, 1999 E.C.R.
II-753; Case T-342/99, Airtours plc v. Comm’n, 2002 E.C.R. II-2585 [hereinafter
Airtours].
67. Chen Aizhu, Chinese State Oil Giants Take Petrol Price Battle to the Pumps, REUTERS
(June 19, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-petrol/chinese-state-oilgiants-take-petrol-price-battle-to-the-pumps-idUSKBN19912D [https://perma.cc/M24S4AHT].
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owned filling stations.68 However, with the advent of Order No.
38 of 199969, the Central Government allowed refined oil prices
to float for the first time from June 2000 onward in accordance
with international oil prices.70 The problem with this mechanism
was that when oil prices fell internationally, China’s SOEs—
because they are also oil importers—could adjust their retail
outlets’ prices immediately. This benefited their own filling
stations, whereas privately-owned filling stations were not
permitted to lower their prices to reflect the new lower
international price for another ten days.71 Consequently, private
filling stations retail sales were unattractive to consumers during
that critical ten-day price-change period. This constitutes
discriminatory pricing, which would not be tolerated under
European Union competition jurisprudence.72 Under European

68. Between 1992 and 1998, a significant measure of fair competition emerged in
the Chinese refined oil retail market because many privately-owned refineries and filling
stations began operating, and refined oil prices partially relied on market mechanisms.
See Yong Huang, Shan Jiang, Diana Moss & Randy Stutz, Application of Anti-Monopoly Law
in China’s Petroleum Sector, 33 MODERN L. SCI., CHINA 79 (2011). However, from 1998
onward the Government reasserted control of the market by a variety of means. For
example, Forbes describes how starting in 1998, the Government voided all of the
operating licenses of private oil importers and wholesalers of finished gasoline product.
See Shu-Ching Jean Chen, China’s Private Oil Force, FORBES (Aug. 23, 2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/shuchingjeanchen/2017/08/23/chinas-private-oilforce/#678dc7e673da [https://perma.cc/5PET-UAVN].
69. See Order No. 38 of 1999, supra note 58.
70. Prices were first allowed to float in mid-2000, and a formal mechanism allowing
this to occur was subsequently adopted in November 2001. Under this mechanism,
Chinese refined oil prices were adjusted when the difference between the global oil
market and the domestic oil market lasted for ten days.
71 . See Guojia Fazhan Gaigewei Guanyu Jinyibu Wanshan Chengpinyou Jiage
Xingcheng Jizhi Youguan Wenti de Tongzhi (Fu: Shiyou Jiage Guanli Banfa) (国家发展
改革委关于进一步完善成品油价格形成机制有关问题的通知(附：石油价格管理办法)
([2016]64 号)) [Notice of the National Development and Reform Commission on Issues
concerning Further Improving the Price Formation Mechanism of Refined Oil (Annex:
Administrative Measures for Oil Prices)] No. 64 [2016] (promulgated by the Nat’l Dev.
and Reform Comm. of China, Jan. 13, 2016, effective Jan. 13, 2016),
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=262409&lib=law
[https://perma.cc/8DCHDF33].
72. See Case C-242/95, GT Link A/S Danske Statsbanen, 1997 E.C.R. I-4453, 446566 (holding that a port operator was not permitted to waive port charges for its own
downstream ferry operator while continuing to charge such charges to competitor ferry
companies); Case C-340/99, TNT Traco SpA v. Poste Italiane SpA, 2001 E.C.R. I-4142,
4152, 4158-60 [hereinafter TNT Traco] (holding that the national postal company could
not charge private competitors in the express mail sector fees (to compensate it for
business lost to its normal next-day delivery postal service) that it does not charge its own
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Union competition law, publicly-owned undertakings entrusted
with the operation of a service of general economic interest by
the State (pursuant to TFEU Article 106) would only be allowed
to (for example) operate cross-subsidization models if they are
obliged to operate within certain operational parameters, e.g., to
balance the publicly-owned undertaking’s books each year. 73
Such parameters would be imposed by the State to oblige the
publicly-owned undertaking to provide their State-assigned
service of general economic interest under the operational
conditions set for them by the State.74 However, in so doing, the
European Court of Justice has made it clear that in such
circumstances, the undertaking cannot charge discriminatory
prices to private competitors compared to what is charged to their
own affiliates who compete with the private competitors in the
relevant downstream market.75
The failure to protect fair competition was exacerbated when
the refined oil pricing mechanisms interacted with State oil
refining subsidies. Such subsidies were paid to oil importers,
which naturally, are the SOEs. The oil refining subsidies distort
fair competition in the gasoline retail market in China because
express mail subsidiary as well. To do so would constitute discriminatory pricing, which
violates TFEU Article 102).
73. The service of general economic interest is typically obliged by its State mandate
to provide a universal service across the State at the same price to all consumers,
irrespective of the commercial viability of each individual transaction, e.g., the national
postal service is mandated to charge the same price to deliver a letter in the capital city
and to the most remote corner of the State. In order to maintain the viability of this State
mandated model, the State will oblige the service provider to subsidize its less profitable
activities or activities that incur losses (e.g., postal deliveries to remote areas) with profits
generated by its profitable activities (e.g., postal deliveries in densely populated cities).
Consequently, the service provider will argue that cross-subsidization between profitable
activities and activities that incur losses is necessary in order for it to carry out its mandate
under the operational parameters set for it by the State (furthermore, this imperative to
cross-subsidize can be put forward as a reason to justify prohibiting the provision of
competing services). See Corbeau, supra note 62.
74. Typical operational parameters imposed by the State on the service provider
can include the obligation to provide the service within certain operational conditions.
Corbeau, supra note 62. The State may require the service to be provided on a universal
basis. See, e.g., RTT, supra note 62 (concerning the provision of a universal telephone
service). A universal service in the RTT context meant the provision of a national
telephone service in every home in the State using a uniform pricing mechanism for all
users irrespective of the cost of providing the services to each individual user. For another
example of a universal service is the national postal service, see TNT Traco, supra note
72.
75. See Corbeau, supra note 62; RTT, supra note 62; TNT Traco, supra note 72.

632 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:3

the interaction between the refined oil pricing mechanisms and
the oil refining subsidies promotes the interests of SOEs and SOEowned filling stations, but not those of the privately-owned filling
stations.76 Again this constitutes discriminatory pricing or crosssubsidization of SOE-affiliated downstream actors (the oil
refining SOE’s own affiliated filling stations) to the detriment of
their private competitors. 77 Few privately-owned filling stations
could cope with this loss from within their own resources to the
same extent—so much for the protection of fair competition.78
Instead the “public interest” clearly favored one category of
competitor—the SOE-owned filling station retailer—over the
privately-owned filling station retailer. No “balancing” of interests
has taken place, again demonstrating that the 2007 Act’s public
interest criterion is simply a way for the State to put its own
interest first, with no consideration given to fair competition
(distortions caused by the cross-subsidization of SOE-owned
filling station affiliates) or consumers interests (reduction in
diversity of ownership of filling stations).
Strategy Two (targeted reductions in supply) is illustrated by
the manner in which unfair competition arising from the “oil
shortages” is tolerated. This meant that frequently, privatelyowned filling stations could not have access to sufficient supplies
76. When import prices of crude oil were allowed to float with international oil
prices, and international prices subsequently rose, the retail prices of private filling
stations could not be adjusted upward for at least ten days (causing all sales to be at a loss
for that period, whereas sales (by contrast) by SOE-owned stations were insulated from
this loss because their refining parent was able to use State subsidies for refining oil to
cushion their retail outlets from the international price rise).
77 . By contrast, under European Union TFEU art. 106 jurisprudence, the
protection of cross-subsidization is only acceptable where it is necessary to ensure that
the appointed undertaking (that is entrusted with the provision of a service of general
economic interest) can operate under “economically acceptable conditions” set for it by
the State. An example is the provision of a universal service to all citizens, at a price that
is not related to the actual cost of providing the service to each individual citizen. But
this does not permit the appointed service provider to engage in discriminatory pricing
in favor of its own affiliates in downstream markets that are subject to competition from
private operators. See generally Corbeau, supra note 62; TNT Traco, supra note 72.
78. Biao Liu, Jiayouzhan Zhengduozhan: Yichang Qudao Zhongduan Zhizheng (加油站
争夺战：一场渠道终端之争) [Filling Stations in Battle: Competing for Distribution Channels],
JINAN (济南) TIMES, CHINA (July 31, 2017); Hui Feng, “Youjia Wenti” de Falv Guizhi – yi
Chanyefa yu Jingzhengfa de Gongneng Zuhe wei Hexin (“油价问题”的法律规制 – 以产业法与
竞争法的功能组合为核心) [Legal Regulations for China’s Oil Prices – Based on Cooperative
Functions between Industrial Policy and Competition Law], 3 FALV KEXUE (法律科学) [SCI.
L.] 122 (2012).
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from the SOE refineries.79 Periodic oil shortages would occur.80
This in effect constitutes a refusal to supply long-standing
customers where orders are in no way out of the ordinary: this
would not be tolerated in the European Union.81 This was made
clear by the European Union, both in its Communication82 on the
topic as far back as 2009, and also from long-standing European
Court of Justice jurisprudence. The European Court of Justice has
long held that dominant suppliers using refusal or restriction of
supplies to attempt to force an existing customer from the market
in order to dominate a downstream or neighboring market, in
circumstances where the customer cannot source alternative
supplies, is condemnable as an abuse of dominance.83 A refusal to
supply in such circumstances would be condemned under
European Union competition law,84 yet it appears to be one that
79. Chen, supra note 67; China’s Private Refineries Blame Oil Shortage on Monopoly,
CHINA DAILY (Dec. 2, 2010), https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/201012/02/content_11643367.htm [https://perma.cc/2GRH-SX7W].
80. PetroChina, Sinopec Stop supplying Oil to Private Stations, GLOBAL TIMES (May 6,
2011), https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/652217.shtml [https://perma.cc/GQM28BA7].
81. The restriction of supplies to private competitors (operating in a downstream
market) by a vertically integrated undertaking, which operates both the raw material
level and the retail level, is potentially a serious abuse when it competes in the
downstream market (e.g., retail) in circumstances where alternative sources of raw
materials are scarce, unless it can be objectively justified. See Frances Dethmers &
Jonathan Blondeel, EU Enforcement Policy on Abuse of Dominance: Some Statistics and Facts,
38 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 147, 151 (2017); Damien Geradin & Evi Mattioli, The
Transactionalization of EU Competition Law: A Positive Development?, 8 J. EUR. COMP. L. &
PRAC. 634, 643 (2017); Manuel Kellerbauer, The Commission’s New Enforcement Priorities in
Applying Article 82 EC to Dominant Companies’ Exclusionary Conduct: A Shift Towards a More
Economic Approach?, 31 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 175, 182-84 (2010); Rossella Incardona,
Modernisation of Article 82 EC and Refusal to Supply: Any Real Change in Sight?, 2 EUR. COMP.
J. 337, 344-45, 361 (2006). For leading CJEU case law on the subject see infra note 84.
82. See Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article
82 EC Treaty (now TFEU art. 102) to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant
Undertakings, ¶¶ 75-90, 2009 O.J. (C 45) 2; see also Anne Witt, The Commission’s Guidance
Paper on Abusive Exclusionary Conduct – More Radical Than it Appears?, 35 EUR. L. REV. 214,
218-19 (2010).
83. See generally Case 27/76, United Brands v. Comm’n, 1978 E.C.R. 207 (holding
that refusal to supply could not be used as a weapon to “discipline” a long-standing
customer who was not acting out of the ordinary); Joined Cases 6 & 7/73, Istituto
Chemioterapico Italiano SpA & Com. Solvents v. Comm’n, 1974 E.C.R. 223
(condemning a refusal to supply whose objective was to eliminate a competitor from a
downstream market, in circumstances where there were few other suitable alternative
sources of supply).
84. The European Court of Justice has elaborated how refusal to supply is abusive
when practised by a dominant supplier in the following contexts: (a) elimination of a

634 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:3

appears not to raise such similar concerns in China,
notwithstanding the provisions of the 2007 Act. 85 Such activity,
were it to occur in the European Union, would be condemned
under European Union competition law because it could lead to
a number of prohibited outcomes: (1) consumer harm (rising
prices or reduced sources of supply86); (2) elimination of effective
competition in downstream markets (i.e., the removal of
competitive constraint arising from the consequent elimination
of private competitors in downstream markets, 87 which is what
occurred in the filling station case study); or (3) private operators

competitor in a downstream market. See Instituto Chemioterapico Italiano, supra note
83, at 250-51, (condemning a refusal to supply whose objective was to eliminate a
competitor from a downstream market, in circumstances where there were few, if any,
other suitable alternative sources of supply); (b) elimination of a competitor unless they
gain access to key infrastructure when no other substitutes are possible. See Case C-7/97,
Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs-und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH
& Co. KG, Mediaprint Zeitungsvertriebsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, & Mediaprint
Anzeigengesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, ECLI:EU:C:1998:569 (1998) (holding that a
refusal to supply access to the dominant player’s nationwide delivery infrastructure
would be abusive where (1) the refusal would likely eliminate all competition in the
market, in particular from the person requesting access; (2) there is no objective
justification for the refusal; (3) having access to the infrastructure must be essential to
the competitor continuing in business; and (4) there must be no other possible substitute
for such access); (c) insistence on not sharing the subject of intellectual property (“IP”)
rights is ordinarily not abusive, yet the European Union courts have held it can become
abusive where the refusal to share the subject of intellectual property rights prevents the
emergence of a new product for which there is consumer demand. See Joined Cases C241 & 242/91P, RTE & ITP v. Comm’n, 1995 E.C.R. I-743, 804-05 (holding that refusal
to supply access to the subject of an IP right is abusive (1) where refusal eliminates all
competition from a competitor seeking to supply a new product for which there is
consumer demand (which the IP owner did not itself produce); (2) in circumstances
where the refusal would eliminate all competition in that market; and (3) where the
refusal cannot be justified by objective considerations). See generally Case T-201/04,
Microsoft Corp. v Comm’n, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289 (2007) (holding that refusal to supply
the subject of an IP right can be abusive where it prevents competition in a neighboring
market; further the Court held that the refusal does not have to eliminate all
competition, but merely risk the elimination of effective competition, in order for it to
be abusive).
85. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fanlongduanfa (中华⼈⺠共和国反垄断法)
[The Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), art. 6, 2007
STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 68 (China) (prohibiting the abuse of a
dominant position).
86. The CJEU condemned a dominant raw materials supplier’s refusal to supply to
downstream competitors in circumstances where alternative source of supply were not
easily available to the downstream competitors. See, e.g., Com. Solvents, supra note 83.
87. See United Brands, supra note 83; Com. Solvents, supra note 83.
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losing customers and going out of business due to inability to
meet consumer demand arising from reduced supplies, thereby
allowing the dominant supplier to eliminate all effective
competition from the downstream retail market. 88 By contrast,
the Chinese authorities do not appear to see such outcomes
posing a threat to the public interest requirement set out in the
2007 Act.
C. The Telecoms Case Study—Inhibiting Fair Competition and
Consumer Welfare: Margin Squeezing and Inhibiting Competitors’
Market Access
What has occurred in the Chinese telecoms market since the
mid-1990s demonstrates that the recent literature is currently in
either a state of denial or confusion, because the 2007 Act’s
competition principles are not being adhered to in the regulation
of the market. The Authors make this observation because the
argument that the “public interest” equates to the balancing of
the State’s interest in economic modernization with the
simultaneous attainment of consumer welfare, is prevalent in
China’s competition literature. 89 Yet the State’s actions (taken
purportedly in pursuit of advancing consumer welfare) often
conflict with, and indeed negate, the “public interest” of
promoting consumer welfare and fair competition, as shall now
be highlighted in the context of the telecoms market.90
88 . See, e.g., United Brands, supra note 83. See also Commission Guidance on
Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 EC (now TFEU art. 102), 2009 O.J. (C 45)
2 (discussing abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings).
89. See, e.g., Liyang Hou, When Competition Law Meets Telecom Regulation: The Chinese
Context, 31 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 689, 696 (2015). See also Chun Liu, Building the
Next Information Superhighway: A Critical Analysis of China’s Recent National Broadband Plan,
39 COMM. ASS’N INFO. SYS. 176, 181 (2016).
90. The telecom network access and broadband competition sector were examined
in three cities of varying sizes: Beijing (北京), Cangzhou (沧州) and Jimo (即墨). These are
cities where China Telecom and China Unicom dominate the network and downstream
markets. The question of ease of allowing network interoperability, and the attractiveness
of network access terms for private competitors in the fixed-broadband market is the
focus. Interviews sought with telecommunications SOEs and privately-owned fixedbroadband operators in these cities met with some unexpected difficulties. First,
privately-owned fixed-broadband operators operating in the survey areas did not wish to
participate. Second, data extracted from the SOEs in Cangzhou (沧州) and Jimo (即墨)
raised serious competition concerns. In these two cities, telecoms SOEs accounted for
more than 90% of the market share in the local fixed-broadband retail market, without
achieving “network interoperability” in residential broadband. For local privately-owned
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The
modernization
process
of
the
Chinese
telecommunications industry presents an excellent example. Two
massive SOEs (China Telecom and China Unicom) formed a
duopoly in the domestic fixed-broadband (telecommunications)
market for decades.91 Private competitors could not access their
networks on attractive terms.92 The inevitable outcome was not
the promotion of competition between service providers (to
thereby advance the 2007 Act’s fair competition and consumer
welfare objectives); rather, the duopoly took advantage of their
incumbent dominant position to offer unattractive access terms,
and segmented the market to inhibit the emergence of
competition, with an adverse impact for both fair competition
and consumer welfare.93 To exacerbate matters, the two telecom
SOEs were permitted to control broadband access terms, and
therefore without legal consequence, restricted market entry by
new competitors by depriving them of sufficiently attractive access
terms. 94 This means that new potential competitors who might
seek to enter the broadband market are deterred, hence negating
fair competition, and also negating the benefits for consumer
welfare that flow from competition between suppliers.
The European Union, by contrast, takes a directly opposite
approach. 95 In a series of cases over the last decade (e.g., C280/08P, Deutche Telekom v. Commission, 2010 E.C.R. I-9555; Case
T-336/07, Telefonica and Telefonica de Espana v. Commission, 2012
fixed-broadband operators, the only way to enter this market was to purchase network
usage rights from the local branches of the dominant telecoms SOEs. However, hardly
any local branches of SOEs wished to sell any part of their fixed-broadband facilities.
91. The case study demonstrates that the market is dominated by the two providers:
China Telecom and China Unicom. An investigation launched into China Unicom and
China Telcom in 2011 by the National Development and Reform Commission (“NDRC”)
found that between them, the two SOEs held 90% of China’s broadband market. See infra
Section III.C.1.
92. See generally Thomas K. Cheng, Competition and the State in China, in
COMPETITION AND THE STATE 170 (Thomas K. Cheng, Ioannis Lianos & D. Daniel
Sokol eds., 2014).
93. See infra Section III.C.1; see also Angela Huyue Zhang, The Role of Media in
Antitrust: Evidence from China, 41 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 473, 475 (2017).
94. This was confirmed in the NDRC decision in 2014. See infra Section III.C.1.
95 . RICHARD FEASEY & MARTIN CAVE, POLICY TOWARDS COMPETITION IN HIGHSPEED BROADBAND IN EUROPE, IN AN AGE OF VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL INTEGRATION
AND OLIGOPOLIES 13-31 (Centre on Regulation in Europe (“CERRE”), 2017); Pablo
Ibanez Colomo, Exclusionary Discrimination under Article 102 TFEU, 51 COMM. MKT. L.
REV. 141, 144 (2014).
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E.C.R. I-172; and Case C-52/09, Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera
Sverige AB, 2011 E.C.R. I-52796) the European Union courts have
condemned practices by network incumbents which inhibited fair
competition and harmed consumers by abusing their incumbent
position, by offering unattractive wholesale access terms to
broadband competitors (while offering lower prices to their own
customers), thereby restricting the development of competition
in downstream markets. As a consequence, where network
owners, who have an obligation to supply access, do so on
unfavorable terms, then that will be condemned by the European
Union authorities as an abusive practice, and can lead to massive
fines.97
This is in direct contrast to the position in China, as the case
study below shall reveal a classic example of similar practices
having no such consequences for the dominant duopoly involved,
despite the fact that their exclusionary activity has effectively
inhibited the emergence of any significant private competition in
the residential broadband market in China. In this circumstance,
the promotion of fair competition, market efficiency, and
consumer welfare cannot be said to be a top priority in the minds

96 . Case C-208/08P, Deutche Telekom v. Commission, 2010 E.C.R. I-955
[hereinafter Deutche Telekom] (affirming the General Court ruling in Case T-271/03,
Deutche Telekom v. Commission, 2008 E.C.R. II-477). The Court of Justice upheld the
Commission Decision condemning Deutche Telkom for “margin squeezing” its
competitors in Germany for access to the local loop, while charging lower prices to its
own retail end-user customers. As a consequence, this was inhibiting the emergence of
competitors, as it meant they would trade at a loss even if they were an efficient
competitor, hence the practice was condemned as abusive. Other judgments that took a
similar approach include the Telfonica Judgment, upholding the Commission’s fine of
152m euros. See Case T-336/07, Telefonica and Telfonica de Espana v. Commission, 2012
E.C.R. I-172 [hereinafter Telefonica]; Case C-295/12P, Telefonica SA v. Commission,
2014 E.C.R. I-2062). See also Case C-52/09, Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige AB,
2011 E.C.R. I-527 [hereinafter Konkurrensverket] (where the Court of Justice
emphasized that unfair access pricing offered to competitors by a network incumbent is
an abuse of dominance because it has the potential to drive them from the market). The
Court emphasized that the pricing practice does not have to have achieved the desired
result (market exclusion) before it can be deemed to be abusive, and added that in order
for it not to be abusive, it should not make competitors, penetration of the market any
more difficult. See David Bailey, The New Frontiers of Article 102 TFEU: Antitrust Imperialism
or Judicious Intervention?, 6 J. ANTITRUST ENF’T 25, 31 (2018); Annalies Azzopardi, No
Abuse Is An Island: The Case of Margin Squeeze, 13 E. COMP. J. 228 (2017); Niamh Dunne,
Margin Squeeze: Theory, Practice, Policy, Parts I and II, 33 E. C. L. REV. 29, 61 (2012).
97. Telefonica, supra note 96 (the European Union Commission imposed a fine of
EU€152 million on Telefonica for margin squeezing its competitors in Spain).
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of the Chinese regulator: instead the public interest that
triumphed was the protection of the duopoly from private
competition.
1. Case Study
In 2011 the National Development and Reform Commission
(“NDRC”) opened an investigation into allegations98 that China
Unicom and Telecom were: (1) abusing their dominant position
to create differential pricing (i.e., charging different prices to
different customers without objective justification); (2) refusing
to facilitate “network interoperability” in the Chinese fixedbroadband market; and (3) maintaining high-level access costs
with a low level internet speed, much to the dissatisfaction of
consumers. 99 The NDRC investigated the anti-competitive
conduct of these two SOEs in 2011,100 and the outcome did not
bode well for the protection of competition in China.101
The NDRC initially proposed fines 102 for violation of the
2007 Act, but did not address the network interoperability
98. In 2011, two large-scale telecommunications SOEs, namely China Telecom and
China Unicom, faced an anti-monopoly probe into the charging differential fees
contrary to the 2007 Act. See Xinhua, Anti-Monopoly Probe into Telecom Giants Confirmed,
CHINA DAILY (Nov. 9, 2011), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/201111/09/content_14066568.htm [https://perma.cc/UQR7-L4FR]; Alexandr Svetlicinii,
Private Litigation under China’s Anti-Monopoly Law: Empirical Evidence and Procedural
Developments, 7 KLRI J.L. & LEGIS. 163, 177 (2017); Hou, supra note 89, at 693-94.
99. See Zhang, supra note 93.
100. Chun Liu, An Evaluation of China’s Evolving Broadband Policy: AN Ecosystem’s
Perspective, 41 TELECOMM. POL’Y 1 (2017); Cheng, supra note 92, at 170-86.
101. Xingyu Yan, The Jurisdictional Delimitation in the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law
Public Enforcement Regime: The Inevitable Overstepping of Authority and the Implications, 6 J.
ANTITRUST ENF’T 123, 144-45 (2018); Xiaoye Wang & Adrian Emch, Five Years of
Implementation of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law – Achievements and Challenges, 1 J. ANTITRUST
ENF’T 247, 258-66 (2013).
102. China Unicom and Telecom faced fines of up to 10% of their annual revenues
from Internet services (up to China¥1 billion (approximately EU€100 million)).
However, the NDRC did not impose fines because in 2014 China Telecom and Unicom
submitted that (1) they had implemented a settlement-free peer sharing agreement since
2013, and (2) they had nearly tripled the interconnection capacity for fixed-broadband
all over the country. Although the NDRC was satisfied with the above outcome, there was
much criticism of the outcome because, between 2011 and 2014 the reduction in the
price for terminal access for fixed-broadband (30% reduction) was still not as significant
as was expected. Furthermore, the decision ignored the problem of high-priced lowspeed fixed-broadband services. The settlement-free peering agreement did not
guarantee full “network interoperability” in the fixed-broadband sector, because it only
benefited telecoms SOEs rather than privately-owned broadband operators.
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problem,103 nor the detriment to consumers of the high-price lowspeed broadband service. The NDRC did however ostensibly
attempt to introduce competition to the sector by giving a small
slice of the fixed-broadband market to China Broadcasting
Network (another SOE, established in 2014),104 heralding it as an
opportunity to introduce competition by way of “triple-play
interoperability” of telecommunications networks, radio
networks and Internet convergence. 105 However, in reality this
inadequate level of intervention has not boosted competition.
The outcome is that this government-initiated probe has, first,
enhanced the position of the two incumbent SOE duopolists (by
not enhancing “network interoperability” for non-SOEs); and
second, it has not enhanced consumer welfare by requiring the
lowering of entry barriers for others who could supply improved
quality broadband service or lower prices for consumers. 106 In
other words, no steps were taken to prohibit the duopoly’s
practices, such as prohibiting the charging of different prices to
different customers, or prohibiting the offering of network access only on
unattractive terms, both of which are essential in order to promote
fair competition by privately-owned fixed-broadband operators.
Commitments made under the 2007 Act did not compensate for the damage caused by
the anti-competitive behavior of China Unicom and Telecom. See, e.g., Zhang, supra note
18; WENDY NG, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COMPETITION LAW IN CHINA 254 (2018).
103. From 2012 onwards, network interoperability of the broadband mainline (the
Chinese public network infrastructure offering network access to broadband suppliers)
was encouraged. However, telecommunications SOEs showed no enthusiasm for
enhancing interoperability for residential broadband network providers. Without
network interoperability, potential fixed-broadband competitors were easily constrained
from entering the market, while existing fixed-broadband competitors were unable to
obtain sufficient stable network bandwidth from telecoms’ SOEs. For example, in
Cangzhou (沧州) (in Hebei Province (河北省)) there were only two non-State-owned
operators which had a combined total of less than 10% of the local market. Telecom
Cangzhou ( 沧 州 ), the broadband mainline supplier to these two non-State-owned
operators, did not offer favorable access terms because the SOEs wished to protect their
own interests. Jing Wang, Fostering or Suppression? Reluctance of Chinese Privately-Owned
Fixed Broadband Operators to Enter the Market from the Perspective of the Anti-Monopoly Law of
China 2007, PROCESS 6TH ANNUAL INT’L CONF. L., REG. & PUB. POL’Y (June 2017),
http://dx.doi.org/10.5176/2251-3809_LRPP17.12 [https://perma.cc/47FC-DG7G].
104. Feifei Fan, CBN Gets Nod As 4th Telecom Operator, CHINA DAILY (May 6, 2016),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2016-05/06/content_25098535.htm
[https://perma.cc/VL3L-MRA6].
105. Fei Jiang, Kuo Huang & Yanran Sun, The Triple-Network Convergence in China:
Implementation and Challenges, in MEDIA CONVERGENCE AND DECONVERGENCE 305, 305-28
(Sergio Sparviero, Corinna Peil & Gabriele Balbi eds., 2017).
106. Zhang, supra note 18.
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Neither was achieved. The market is growing, 107 but the
competition is not.108
In this regard, the NDRC decision has critical weaknesses
that are detrimental to both consumer welfare and fair
competition: vis-a-vis consumer welfare, expensive low-speed
broadband services remain; and vis-a-vis fair competition, private
competitors cannot take advantage of the NDRC decision
because it only gave preference to another SOE to enter the
market. The NDRC decision did not lower entry barriers for
private operators.109 It did not restore competition: the third SOE
has not made the market substantially more competitive than it
was before.110 Consumer welfare and fair competition fail to be
promoted or protected111 because the interoperability obstacles

107. China Telecom’s fixed-broadband users increased by more than 10 million
across China (10% growth). See, e.g., Duibi Sanda Yunyingshang “Qimo Chengjidan”, Cong
Shujuzhong Kan Pinsha (对比三大运营商”期末成绩单”，从数据中看拼杀) [Compare the 3
Major Operators’ “Final Transcripts”: see the competition from the Data], PEOPLE’S POST &
TELEGRAPH (Feb. 1, 2018), http://tc.people.com.cn/n1/2018/0201/c18300829799490.html [https://perma.cc/X44H-BQ4E].
108. Because telecommunication SOEs still dominated the market, without
granting genuine network interoperability, high entry barriers continued to militate
against the prospects for the non-State-owned fixed-broadband operators. See Hou,
supra note 89, at 692. The Authors’ case study provides an illustrative example: in
Cangzhou (沧州) (in Hebei Province (河北省)) two private broadband operators holding
10% of the market between them in 2012, ceased to operate by 2015, leaving only one
private operator in the market, a new entrant which held a mere 0.18% market share.
109. This outcome contrasts with the outcome in similar cases decided by the
European Commission and European Union courts. See, e.g., Deutche Telekom, supra
note 96; Telefonica, supra note 96; Konkurrensverket, supra note 96.
110. This Decision presents a prime example of how the State’s attempts to make
the market more competitive continue to be thwarted not only by SOEs but also by its
own actions. Another example is seen in the State-initiated Mixed-Ownership Reform
(2013), permitting private funds to invest in telecom SOEs. This has not resulted in an
increase in market competition. In fact, the opposite occurred because the outcome is
the emergence of super-monopolies which further extend SOEs market dominance. For
example, major incumbent SOE broadband provider China Unicom received substantial
investment from the leading Chinese search engine (Baidu (百度)), the largest online
retail platform (Alibaba (阿里巴巴)), and the largest social media provider (Tencent (
腾讯)). This investment gives the SOE increased influence over these new emerging
powerful technology-based consumer retail and social media platforms. For an analysis
of the Mixed-Ownership Reform, see Yu Zheng, China’s State-Owned Enterprise Mixed
Ownership Reform, 4 E. ASIAN POL’Y. 39 (2014).
111. Contrast this approach with the approach taken by the European Union in the
Cases discussed above. See, e.g., Telefonica, supra note 96; Konkurrensverket, supra note
96; Deutche Telekom, supra note 96.
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remain, and private competitors cannot take advantage of the
NDRC decision in this case.112
Thus, the Authors conclude that the above presents a clear
example where the nationally sanctioned duopoly is not regarded
as a threat to consumer welfare (when it clearly is); and that
promoting fair competition is not taken seriously (as is evidenced
by the toleration of the duopoly, which clearly restricted network
access for competitors). Crucially, this decision highlights that the
idea that the public interest is a kind of “balancing mechanism”
between competing interests113, is clearly an illusion. It seems clear
that the “public interest” tolerates a situation whereby attaining
dominance and all of the attendant dangers 114 that follow for
protection of consumer welfare and fair competition is not seen
as contrary to the State’s interests. Nor is it contrary to the “public
interest” either, particularly when, as this case shows, restriction
of unfair competition (exclusionary conduct leading to severe
restriction of competition in the downstream market) is not seen
as a problem for regulators to take effective measures to solve.
This is a clear example of where, SOE action, taken in the name
of consumer welfare (allowing duopoly), in fact achieves the
opposite outcome (lack of competition, to the detriment of
consumer welfare, and additionally promotion of unfair
competition vis-a-vis potential new market entrants), retarding
efficiency, innovation, and consumer welfare.
D. The Steel Mills Rationalization Program—Economic Efficiency and
Fair Competition: An Example of Where Neither Objective Was
Achieved
The case study on the steel industry115 presents an immediate
contrast with the European position on the question of the public
112. See NG, supra note 102 (pointing out that that private competitors could not
take advantage of the NDRC ruling).
113. WANG, supra note 11, at 351-52.
114. Abusive pricing, illegal rebates, refusal to supply, market sharing, etc.
115. For the purposes of this steel study, the Authors focused on “administrative
mergers” (which the Authors call “forced mergers”) to assess the extent to which private
competitors had been greatly reduced in number by State-sanctioned takeovers. The
“Steel Industry Revitalization Plan” (2009) proposed a government-driven merger
regime to enhance the industry’s concentration, and the “Guiding Opinions on
Promoting the Merger and Reorganization of the Steel Industry to Manage Zombie
Enterprises” (2016), streamlined the process. Chinese mainstream media reported that
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interest and forced mergers. In China, notwithstanding that the
2007 Act 116 refers to concentrations occurring by way of fair
competition or voluntary alliance, the State’s administrative
agencies 117 frequently bring about forced mergers of otherwise
profitable corporations, irrespective of the adverse impact on
competition (forced consolidation eliminating competitors);
irrespective of the impact on consumers (potentially rising prices
due to elimination of competing sources of supply); and
irrespective of the fact that the strategy (to reduce sector output)
failed. The 2007 Act’s proclamation in its opening Article that it
seeks to protect and safeguard the interests of consumers (e.g.,
from rising prices); market efficiency (e.g., maintaining sources
of supply); and particularly the maintenance of fair competition,
appears to have had no role to play in preventing such forced
mergers. Instead, in China, State policy to promote industry
rationalization (in pursuit of China’s ambition to dominate the
global steel industry) trumped all the above-mentioned
competition considerations, demonstrating that the 2007 Act’s
public interest objective has nothing to do with maintaining

mergers under this Plan were “administrative mergers.” For example, Bao Steel and Wu
Steel were merged in 2016 to secure its position as the world’s second biggest steel maker.
See Luo Guoping, Taozi Wei & Ke Dawei, Steel Giants Forge Merger as China Moves to
Strengthen State Sector, CAIXIN (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.caixinglobal.com/2018-0928/steel-giants-forge-merger-as-china-moves-to-strengthen-state-sector-101331148.html
[https://perma.cc/UTK4-U93F]. The Authors examined instances where State policy
has been to approve steel takeovers in pursuit of a policy to seriously reduce the number
of private producers, irrespective of the fact that they were both productive and profitable, which
naturally resulted in an increase in market concentration, and consequently, less
competition. Hebei province (河北省) (Northeast China, near Beijing (北京), population
74.70 million people) was selected for the study. CHINA STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 2017 2-6
(China Stat. Press 2017); Guangyu Tuijin Gangtie Chanye Jianbing Chongzu Chuzhi
Jiangshi Qiye Gongzuo Fang’an (关于推进钢铁产业兼并重组处置僵尸企业工作方案)
[Guiding Opinions on Promoting the Merger and Reorganization of the Steel Industry
to Manage Zombie Enterprises] (promulgated by the St. Council of China, 2016,
effective 2016).
116 . Business operators may, through fair competition or voluntary alliance,
concentrate themselves according to law, expand the scope of business operations, and
enhance competitiveness. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fanlongduanfa (中华⼈⺠共
和 国 反 垄 断 法 ) [The Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug.
1, 2008), art. 5, 2007 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 68 (China).
117. An example is the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration
Commission of the State Council (“SASAC”).
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competition in the marketplace. The contrast with the European
Union approach is illuminating.118
In contrast to China, mergers of private corporations in the
European Union cannot be forced, especially if a corporation is
profitable.119 In the European Union, the only situation where a
State is permitted to interfere with a proposed merger is where it
either (1) poses a distinct competition threat in that State’s
market (Article 9 MCR)120 or (2) where it can invoke “legitimate
interests” within the meaning of Article 21(4) MCR to take action
against some non-competition aspect of the merger, i.e., to
protect plurality of the media, public security or prudential
118. Case M.8444, ArcelorMittal/Ilva, Comm’n Decision, 2018 O.J. (C 351) (an
illustrative recent example showing how the European Union regulatory authorities were
very conscious of the potential impact on consumers and competition when they
examined the proposed takeover by Arcelor Mittal of its second largest competitor, Ilva).
The Commission cleared the takeover, conditioned on Arcelor divesting key production
assets in no less than 6 European Union Member States in order to assure the
Commission that prices would not rise after the merger, as competitors would acquire
these productive assets under a proposed remedy package. Arcelor is the largest
producer in Europe of flat carbon steel. It was acquiring Ilva, the largest single-site
carbon flat carbon steel plant in Europe. The Commission confirmed it was happy to
accept the commitments as it would ensure that prices did not rise for consumers in the
hot rolled steel, cold rolled steel, and galvanised steel markets following the
implementation of the disinvestments. The Commission cleared ArcelorMittal’s
acquisition of Ilva, subject to the above conditions.
119. Forced mergers are not the norm in European Union Member States which
are free market economies. Apart from highly exceptional circumstances where the State
may seek to invoke emergency powers or nationalize private corporations to protect
against vital strategic economic collapse or systemic market failure, private enterprises
can operate without fear of being forced into a merger with a State-owned enterprise. An
example is the 2008 UK banking crisis, where Lloyds TSB Bank was induced to take over
the failing HBOS bank (which faced a liquidity meltdown) in return for Government
promises not to scrutinize the takeover deal from a competition perspective. See Council
Regulation 139/2004, 2004 O.J. (EC) (the European Union’s Merger Regulation)
(which does not provide any legal basis for the promotion of forced mergers).
120. Council Regulation 139/2004, art. 9, 2004 O.J. (EC). The European Union’s
Merger Regulation provides inter alia that the European Commission may refer a
proposed concentration notified to it, back to the competent authorities of a concerned
Member State, where either (1) the concentration threatens to significantly affect
competition in a market within that Member State, which presents all the characteristics
of a distinct market, or (2) the concentration affects competition in a market within that
Member State, which presents all the characteristics of a distinct market and which does
not constitute a substantial part of the common market. The concerned Member State
may take only the measures strictly necessary to safeguard or restore effective
competition in the State market concerned. See generally Philipp Werner, Serge Clerckx
& Henry de la Barre, Commission Expansionism in EU Merger Control – Fact and Fiction, 9 J.
EUR. COMP. L. & PRAC. 133-45 (2018); PARKER & MAJUMDAR, supra note 37.
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rules.121 But in neither case are the State’s powers exercisable for
the purpose of forcing a merger. The MCR merely allows a State to
interfere with a proposed merger’s terms on either distinct local
competition or prudential grounds. So, in neither instance can
the European Union or its constituent Member States force
mergers of private corporations to occur in pursuit of European
Union/State economic objectives or industrial policy.122
Here the contrast with China is immediate: forced mergers
in Europe would be seen as unfair competition, only to be tolerated
where a grave economic meltdown was imminent;123 whereas in
China, forced mergers of otherwise profitable and healthily
trading corporations are tolerated—in fact they are actively
pursued by the State124—notwithstanding that they may reduce
competition; lead to increased prices; not achieve desired
efficiencies; or promote unfair competition. This demonstrates
that fair competition, market participants’ welfare, and consumer
welfare all yield to the public interest in pursuing State industrial
policy to reduce the number of players in the industry.

121. An example is making sure that unfit people (such as criminals) do not
become media owners, or owners of key institutions, such as banks.
122. This should not be confused with the failing firm defence where in exceptional
circumstances the European Union can approve mergers of failing firms provided that
certain strict criteria are satisfied. See Aerospatiale-Alenia / De Havilland, supra note 27.
The European Union Commission did not allow a take-over of a failing firm to go
through on the basis that although it was a failing firm, the proposed merger would
threaten competition in the market for turboprop commuter aircraft in the European
Union. However, the Commission relaxed its position somewhat in the subsequent
Decision. See Kali-Salz/MdK/Treuhand, supra note 27 (specifying that three criteria must
be satisfied: (1) The failing firm will be in imminent danger of being forced out of the
market because of financial difficulties if not taken over by another undertaking; (2)
There is no less anti-competitive alternative than the proposed takeover, and (3) In the
absence of a merger, the assets of the failing firm would inevitably exit the market).
123. There can be highly exceptional circumstances where the State may seek to
invoke emergency powers or nationalize private corporations to protect against vital
strategic economic collapse or systemic market failure (e.g., the 2008 U.K. banking crisis,
whereby Lloyds TSB Bank was induced to take over the failing HBOS bank (which faced
a liquidity meltdown) in return for Government promises not to scrutinize the takeover
deal from a competition perspective). However, European Union Member States cannot
force mergers to occur.
124. The starting point of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology
(“MIIT”) “Guiding Opinions on Promoting the Merger and Reorganization of the Steel
Industry to Manage Zombie Enterprises” (2016) can be traced back to 2005 when
“Policies for the Development of the Iron and Steel Industry” (2005) was launched by
MIIT, followed by the “Steel Industry Revitalization Plan” (2009) 4 years later.

2021] HOW COMPETITION IDEALS ARE EMASCULATED

645

The case study below will show that there was no “balancing
act’” between the different interests: clearly the public interest
and the State’s interest (forcing industry consolidation to further
China’s dominance ambitions in the global steel sector) were one
and the same. The “Steel Mills Revitalization Program”
(commenced in 2005) provides an excellent example of the
elimination of many private competitors from the steel milling
industry occurring between 2005 and 2010. 125 It was directly
attributable to State action, which favored steel milling SOEs, and
yet did not achieve the hoped-for efficiencies.126
With the advent of the “Steel Industry Revitalization Plan”
(2009), small and medium-scale mills numbering in the
thousands were either closed down or forced to merge with SOEs
all across China over a short period (by 2016). 127 Those not
forcibly closed were subsumed into large-scale SOE enterprises,
125. During these years, the number of steel mills operating in China was reduced
from over 7,000 to under 900 under the “Policies for the Development of the Iron and
Steel Industry” (2005) and the “Steel Industry Revitalization Plan” (2009) sponsored by
the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology. See Guoxinban Juxing Shangbannian
Gongye Tongxinye Jingji Yunxing deng Qingkuang Fabuhui (国新办举行上半年工业通信业
经济运行等情况发布会) [Press Conference Held by the State Council Information Office on
Economic Performance of China’s Industry and Communication Industry in the First Half Year],
COUNCIL
INFO.
OFF.,
CHINA
(July
20,
2010),
ST.
http://www.scio.gov.cn/xwfbh/xwbfbh/wqfbh/2010/0720/ [https://perma.cc/PL9NUALF].
126. Ambitious targets for industry consolidation were first set in 2005 (“Policies
for the Development of the Iron and Steel Industry” (2005)) but were not met. More
specific targets were set in 2009 (“Steel Industry Revitalization Plan” (2009)), and
restated again (along with some additional targets) in 2016 in the “Guiding Opinions on
Promoting the Merger and Reorganization of the Steel Industry to Manage Zombie
Enterprises” (2016), which sets the following targets for achievement by 2025: (1) steel
industrial concentration achieving 60% (still not achieved); (2) the output of the top ten
large steel undertakings to rise to 60-70% of total Chinese steel output (still not
achieved); (3) the formation of three or four steel groups, with a production capacity of
80 million tonnes (approaching target achievement by end 2021); (4) the formation of
six to eight steel groups with a production capacity of 40 million tonnes (approaching
target achievement by end 2021). See Guangyu Tuijin Gangtie Chanye Jianbing Chongzu
Chuzhi Jiangshi Qiye Gongzuo Fang’an (关于推进钢铁产业兼并重组处置僵尸企业工作
方案) [Guiding Opinions on Promoting the Merger and Reorganization of the Steel
Industry to Manage Zombie Enterprises] (promulgated by the St. Council of China,
2016, effective 2016).
127. This was achieved under the “Steel Industry Revitalization Plan (2009).” See
Press Conference Held by the State Council Information Office on Economic Performance of China’s
Industry and Communication Industry in the First Half Year, supra note125; Liang Qian, 2018
nian Gangtieye Jianbing Chongzu jiang Jiasu (2018 年钢铁业兼并重组将加速) [M&A in the
Steel Industry Will Be Accelerate in 2018], ECON. INFO. DAILY (Jan. 10, 2018).
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not voluntarily, but rather by way of “administrative intervention”
(i.e., forced mergers). The outcome of this rationalization was to
rapidly reduce the number of steel mills operating across China
from over 7,000 to less than 900 by 2010, 128 with an ultimate
objective of having no more than 200 enterprises operating in the
sector by 2025.129
1. Case Study
First, the following example demonstrates how unscientific
this process has been. Second, this Section argues that the process
has failed to enhance economic efficiency. Sector output has
declined, mainly because competitors were forced to exit the
market, by means of either forced mergers or forced closures, in
either case as a result of administrative intervention.
The provincial merger regime in Hebei province130 provides a
useful example of a government-led merger process that had
poor outcomes. Because of the lack of familiarity with industry
knowledge, the local provincial government often acts both as a
driver and as a manipulator of forced mergers, taking merger
decisions subjectively, without taking market conditions into
account. 131 Mill operators’ views are frequently ignored. 132 In
2010, the local Hebei provincial government proposed that 88
local steel enterprises (both State-owned and privately-owned
128 . See Press Conference Held by the State Council Information Office on Economic
Performance of China’s Industry and Communication Industry in the First Half Year, supra note
125.
129. See Guangyu Tuijin Gangtie Chanye Jianbing Chongzu Chuzhi Jiangshi Qiye
Gongzuo Fang’an (关于推进钢铁产业兼并重组处置僵尸企业工作方案) [Guiding
Opinions on Promoting the Merger and Reorganization of the Steel Industry to Manage
Zombie Enterprises] (promulgated by the St. Council of China, 2016, effective 2016)
(setting this target).
130. Hebei province (河北省) is China’s biggest steel-producing region.
Implementing the rationalization strategy set out in the “Steel Industry Revitalization
Plan” (2009) and the subsequent “12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) for China’s Iron
and Steel Industry,” the Hebei provincial government played an active part in the steel
mills’ forced mergers/closures process. See Liang, supra note 127.
131. In particular, each provincial government makes proposals on steel mergers
within its own province and then submits each proposal individually to the MIIT. If the
local government receives a positive reply, the proposed merger proceeds.
132 . Privately-owned steel enterprises would prefer to reduce government
intervention. Pengfei Gao, Hebeisheng Gangtie Qiye Lianhe Chongzu Moshi Fenxi (河北省钢
铁企业联合重组模式分析) [Analysis on the Restructuring Mode of Steel Enterprises in Hebei
Province], 10 CHINA STEEL 14, 17 (2011).
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operators) should be restructured, by way of either forced closure
or forced mergers, so that there would be only approximately 15
enterprises operating in that province by the end of 2015.133 This
meant that apart from two steel SOEs (namely Hebei Iron & Steel
Group Company Limited (“HBIS”) and Shougang Group), the
province’s privately-owned steel enterprises had to compete for
the remaining 13 places, otherwise, their fate was either a forced
merger or forced closure. 134 In order to protect their own
interests, privately-owned steel enterprises in the local market
often undertook non-violent resistance in order to interfere with
the smooth progress of their government-led mergers. 135 The
actual outcome of these forced mergers made two steel SOEs
(Hebei Steel and Shougang Group) larger136, but not necessarily
stronger, because by following the plan’s implementation, those
private operators that managed to remain active137 in the market
continued to produce the majority of the sector’s output in Hebei
province.138 Faced with this somewhat embarrassing situation, the
Central Government re-intensified efforts to force mergers in

133. This draconian target set in 2015 for Hebei province (河北省) for achievement
by 2020 was not realized, and has now been deferred to 2025. Qian Liang, Gangtieye
Xinyibo Jianbing Chongzu Jiangqi (钢铁业新一波兼并重组将启) [New Wave of M&A’s in the
Steel Industry Coming], JINGJI CANKAO BAO (经济参考报) [ECON. INFO. DAILY] (Sept. 28,
2018); Liu Heng, Gangqi Jianbing Chongzu, Tisu Gengyao Tizhi (钢企兼并重组 提速更要提
质) [Merger and Reorganization of Steel Enterprises, Quality over Speed], ZHONGGUO KUANGYE
BAO ( 中 国 矿 业 报 ) [CHINA MINING NEWS] (Jan. 7, 2021),
http://www.zgkyb.com/yuqing/20210107_65911.htm
[https://perma.cc/QD5ZEN2Q].
134. Liang, supra note 127.
135. Ruimin Zhai, Hebei Gangtie Jituan Zhudong Tichu Jieyue (河北钢铁集团主动提出
解约) [Hebei Steel Group Proposes to Terminate Previously-Announced Merger Agreements], 454
WANGYI
CAIJING
(
网
易
财
经
)
[NETEASE]
(2014),
http://money.163.com/special/view454/ [https://perma.cc/TVT3-4BQN].
136. Liang, supra note 127.
137. By now, private operators in Hebei province (河北省) have reduced to around
100 in number, and this number will be reduced to 60 by 2020 via forced merger. See id.
138. For example, in the first ten months of 2017, in Hebei province, privatelyowned steel enterprises actually produced 70.64% of local steel production,
demonstrating they continue to be very successful compared to their SOE counterparts.
Qianshiyue Hebei Gangqi Yingli chao 520yi, Zuigao Dungang Yingli jin 900yuan (前 10 月河
北钢企盈利超 520 亿 最高吨钢盈利近 900 元) [Hebei Steel Enterprises’ Profit over 5,200
million, Highest Profit for One Ton of Steel nearly 900 Yuan RMB], SINA (Dec. 15, 2017),
http://finance.sina.com.cn/money/future/indu/2017-12-15/docifypsvkp3612303.shtml [https://perma.cc/M8X9-ZX4Z].
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China’s steel industry in 2018:139 as a result, over one-third of the
total number of privately-owned steel enterprises in China have
now undergone forced mergers. 140 Accordingly, gradual
withdrawal of privately-owned steel enterprises will become an
inevitable result in the Chinese steel sector.
So, from this example (and there are many others141), it can
be readily observed that “administrative mergers” are the method
favored to achieve the State’s consolidation requirements in the
steel sector. This approach does not treat different types of
interests in either a fair-minded manner (e.g., due to the forced
mergers of otherwise productive and profitable companies, as
seen in the Hebei province between 2009-2016). Nor does it take
the practical demands of the Chinese steel industry into account.

139. Z.C. Li & R.Q. Dong, BaoWu Hebing Yixiaobu Xinban Gnagtieye Zhenghe Luxiantu
Chushui (宝武合并一小步新版钢铁业整合路线图出水) [One Small Step for Bao Steel and
Wu Steel, One Big Step for the New Version of the Steel Industry Integration Roadmap], JINGJI
GUANCHA (经济观察) [ECON. OBSERVER] (Sept. 24, 2016).
140. Liang, supra note 127.
141. Forced mergers have been taking place all around the country, as per the
targets set by the MIIT’s “Guiding Opinions on Promoting the Merger and
Reorganization of the Steel Industry to Manage Zombie Enterprises” (2016). In addition,
in 2008, an administrative merger (i.e., a forced merger) took place in Shandong province
between two large-scale steel enterprises, Shandong Steel (an SOE with heavy losses) and
Rizhao Steel (a profitable privately-owned enterprise). It was mandated and supervised
by the local provincial government. Without regard for the 2007 Act, the loss-making
SOE gained possession of 67% of the new merged company, and therefore controlled its
destiny. See Jason Dean, Andrew Browne & Shai Oster, China ‘State Capitalism’ Sparks a
STREET
J.
(ASIA)
(Nov.
17,
2010),
Global
Backlash,
WALL
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703514904575602731006315198#:~:t
ext=Foreign%20companies%20dominated%20production%20and,was%20declared%20
a%20national%20priority [https://perma.cc/3BXW-KRWF]; Crowded Out, CHINA ECON.
REV.
(Oct.
15,
2012),
https://chinaeconomicreview.com/crowded-out/
[https://perma.cc/Y9LG-3VFJ].
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The State’s policy seems to be the sole basis driving
consolidation in this industry, with no effective role for
competition law and policy, which ought to regulate competition
in the steel market, protect the “public interest,” and restrict
potentially anti-competitive steel mergers. The restructuring of
steel enterprises arose from administrative intervention, not market
forces. And most surprisingly, the forced merger process did not
help the steel industry to improve its productivity or efficiency,
notwithstanding its increased industrial concentration. Analysis
of industry data (starting from 2005) covering 12 years of
intensive restructuring reveals that both the output of the top ten
largest steel enterprises and the output of the top four largest steel
enterprises failed to show improvement during the restructuring
period (Chart 1 below). 142 Such a trend illustrates that
administrative intervention promoting industrial concentration
did not achieve the 2009 Plan’s target for the top ten largest steel

142. Chart 1: The Output of the Top Ten and the Top Four Largest Chinese Steel
Enterprises (out of the China’s entire annual steel output between 2005-17)

Sources: This chart was compiled by the Authors, and is composed of the
combination of data from multiple sources for particular years as follows: For data for
2005-2008, see ZHONGGUO CHANYE ZHENGCE BIANDONG QUSHI SHIZHENG YANJIU 20002010 (中国产业政策变动趋势实证研究) [THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF CHINESE INDUSTRY
POLICY CHANGING TENDENCY 2000-2010] 176 (Ying Zhao & Yueju Ni eds., 2012). For data
on 2009, see (1) Du Lihui, Chen Guangjie & Shi Guirong, Dui Woguo Gangcai Chanpin
Jizhongdu de Fenxi (对我国钢材产品集中度的分析) [Analysis on the Concentrations of Steel
Products in China], 4 CHINA STEEL 13 (2010) (China); and (2) Liu Long, Gangtie Chanye
Shichang Shili yu Jiegou Fenxi (钢铁产业市场势力与结构分析) [Analysis on the Market Power
and Structure of the Iron and Steel Industry], 454 CO-OPERATIVE ECON. & SCI. 1, 2 (2012)
(China). For data for 2010-2017, see Ding Tingting, Gangtie (钢铁) [Steel], GUOSHENG
SEC.,
CHINA
(Nov.
16,
2019),
http://pdf.dfcfw.com/pdf/H3_AP201911181370836883_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SU24-X87V].
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enterprises to produce sixty percent of the country’s entire steel
production output by 2015.143
Finally, although outside the scope of this Article, it is worth
noting that the primacy of State industrial policy over
competition law adherence is most aptly demonstrated by these
forced mergers proceeding without any detailed decisions
published to demonstrate how they are compatible with the 2007
Act. 144 Under the 2007 Act only merger prohibition decisions or
conditional clearance decisions require publication; 145 i.e., a
published decision is produced when a merger is either

143. However, the State’s steel intervention program presses ahead, with intensive
restructuring ongoing in this sector. See Liang, supra note 127.
144. In reality, the Ministry of Commerce of China (“MOFCOM”) is not notified
about all domestic mergers. Deborah J. Healey & Zhang Chenying, Bank Mergers in China:
What Role for Competition?, 12 ASIAN J. COMP. L. 81 (2017); Wang & Emch, supra note 101,
at 267.
145. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fanlongduanfa (中华⼈⺠共和国反垄断法)
[The Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), art. 30,
2007 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 68 (China). SAMR’s 2020 proposals
to reform the 2007 Act propose no change to this publication requirement. See SAMR’s
2020 reform proposals: Fanlongduanfa Xiuding Cao’an (Gongkai Zhengqiu Yijiangao)
( 《 反 垄 断 法 》 修 订 草 案 ( 公 开 征 求 意 ⻅ 稿 )) [Draft (for public comment) on the
Amendment of the Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 of China] (promulgated by the State
Admin. for Mkt Regul., Jan. 2, 2020), art. 35 (China). A minor change is proposed in the
case of conditional clearance decisions in a separate SAMR 2020 merger reform proposal
document, where it is proposed that, where SAMR decides to change or remove
conditions in a conditional clearance decision, it shall publicize such decision to the
general public in a timely manner. See Jingyingzhe Jizhong Shencha Zanxing Guiding
(Zhengqiu Yijiangao) (经营者集中审查暂行规定(征求意⻅稿)) [Draft (for comment)
on Interim Provisions on the Review of Concentrations of Business Operators]
(promulgated by SAMR, Jan. 7, 2020), art. 68 (China). At the time of writing, these
proposals have not been passed.
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prohibited 146 or conditionally cleared subject to conditions. 147
Those that are cleared annually without conditions are many
times more numerous and yet they are not accompanied by any
form of published decision other than an announcement of their
clearance, 148 so it is unclear whether those mergers that were
146. See, e.g., MOFCOM Announcement (2009) No. 22 prohibiting Coca-Cola’s
proposed acquisition of Huiyuan on account of concerns that Coca-Cola would leverage
its dominance in the carbonated soft drinks market in China, to the juice market in
China. MOFCOM Announcement No. 22 of 2009 (promulgated by the Ministry of
Commerce,
Mar.
18,
2009),
http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/200903/18/content_1262233.htm [https://perma.cc/Z2JY-63PN] (China). Notwithstanding
the scale of this transaction, the decision is not very detailed, less than ten pages in length
(often typically MOFCOM Announcements are less than five pages long); another
example would be the MOFCOM Announcement (2014) No. 46 prohibiting the
proposed concentration of undertakings by Maersk, MSC and CMA CGM seeking to
establish a network centre (this was only a four-page decision, and is the most recent
prohibition decision that can be found either on the MOFCOM website (prior to 2019),
or on the SAMR website (2019 onwards). The Authors are aware that since 2014 only a
relatively small number of mergers have been prohibited by MOFCOM, yet only one of
those prohibition decisions could be found on the MOFCOM official website. See
Shangwubu Gonggao 2014nian Di46hao (商务部公告 2014 年第 46 号) [MOFCOM
Announcement No. 46 of 2014] (promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce, ), Jun. 17,
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/201406/20140600628586.shtml
2014),
[https://perma.cc/T9UH-S5Y6] (China). No prohibition decisions could be found on
SAMR’s official website. See SAMR, Conditional Approval/Prohibition of Concentration Cases,
SAMR, http://www.samr.gov.cn/fldj/tzgg/ftjpz/index.html [https://perma.cc/5GX8U2C8] (last visited Dec. 22, 2020).
147. See, e.g., MOFCOM Announcement (2009) No. 28 (promulgated by the
Ministry of Commerce, Apr. 24, 2009),
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ztxx/200904/20090406198805.html?4168590711=
3683028003.%201/3 [https://perma.cc/GQ39-E4E4] (China) (regarding the
conditional approval of Mitsubishi Rayon’s acquisition of Lucite-International);
MOFCOM Announcement (2013) No. 58 (promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce,
Aug. 12, 2013),
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/buwei/201308/20130800259186.
shtml [https://perma.cc/AET7-BL2S] (China) (regarding the conditional approval of
the acquisition of Gambro AB by Baxter International Inc); MOFCOM Announcement
(2018) No. 31 (promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce, Mar. 15, 2018),
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/buwei/201803/20180302719967.
shtml [https://perma.cc/K9WE-2YVQ](China) (regarding the conditional approval of
Bayer Aktiengesrllschaft, Kwa Investment Co.’s acquisition of Monsanto Company).
148. As an illustration, in 2018, 4 mergers were granted conditional clearance,
accompanied by a detailed decision in each case. By contrast, 444 mergers approved
without conditions in the same year contained no published narrative, other than a
notice confirming merger approval, e.g., no description of either the main features of
the mergers nor the reasons why they were approved. There were no prohibition
decisions in 2018. In 2017, 325 mergers were approved without conditions, with (again)
none accompanied by any published competition clearance assessment nor any detailed
information about the merger. In the same year, 7 mergers approved subject to
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approved outright have ever been assessed on competition
compatibility grounds under the 2007 Act at all, when clearly the
2007 Act requires that they should be.
E. Summary of Conclusions from the Case Studies
The above three case studies illuminate how the toleration
of anti-competitive practices (clearly contrary to the 2007 Act) is
widespread and embedded in both State industrial policy and in
the market practices of SOEs across different industries in China.
Whether the practice is margin-squeezing; refusals to supply
without objective justification; the leveraging of upstream
dominance to acquire downstream dominance; discriminatory
pricing; or forced acquisition of profitable companies: all such
practices are frequent features of the legal and business landscape
in China, undertaken in the name of industrial policy and
economic development. The protection of consumers; the
promotion of market efficiency; and the prohibition of unfair
competitive practices do not appear to be key objectives of
China’s antitrust regulators. None of these values appear to pose
inhibitory obstacles to the adoption of anti-competitive State
policies or the pursuit of anti-competitive activities by SOEs. The
only conclusion therefore, is that the public interest concept in
the 2007 Act equates to the State’s pursuit of industrial policy; it
is the superior norm over traditional competition values as we

conditions were accompanied by published decisions. In the case of the 12 mergers
either prohibited or withdrawn in that year, no detailed decision accompanied any of
those 12 prohibition decisions. This reflects a familiar pattern (not publishing merger
prohibition decisions) apart from a small number of exceptions where prohibition
decisions were published. See supra note 146. See 2017nian Shangwu Gongzuo Nianzhong
Zongshu Zhijiu (2017 年商务工作年终综述之九) [The 2017 Year-End Business Work Review
No
9],
MOFCOM
(Jan.
9,
2018),
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ae/ai/201801/20180102696433.shtml
[https://perma.cc/AKC7-PLE5] (China); Zhengping Gu & Sihui Sun, 2017nian
Zhongguo Fanlongduan Zhifa Huigu yu Zhanwang (2017 年中国反垄断执法回顾与展望)
[Retrospect and Prospects for China’s Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement in 2017], ANJIE L. FIRM
(Jan. 9, 2018), http://www.anjielaw.com/uploads/soft/180109/1-1P1091I616.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AET7-BL2S]; Zhengping Gu & Sihui Sun, 2018 nian Zhongguo
Fanlongduan Zhifa Huigu – Jingyingzhe Jizhong (2018 年中国反垄断执法回顾——经营者集
中篇) [Retrospect for China’s Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement in 2018 – Merger], ANJIE L/
FIRM
(Jan.
11,
2019),
http://www.anjielaw.com/uploads/soft/190115/11Z115112Q8.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9WE-2YVQ].
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know them in the European Union; and that norm relegates the
protection of competition norms to the sideline.
IV. LEGAL AND RESOURCE REFORMS TO ENABLE
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT TO BECOME EFFECTIVE
AGAINST ANTI-COMPETITIVE SOE PRACTICES IN CHINA
Before concluding, the Authors shall discuss three essential
regulatory reforms 149 that are needed in order to enhance the
role and effectiveness of China’s antitrust agency, the reformed
ministerial-level State Administration of Market Regulation
(“SAMR”) ministry (2018). SAMR oversees the newly established
sub-ministerial level enforcement agency, the National AntiMonopoly Agency.150 This new structure was designed to replace
three other sub-ministerial agencies. 151 Previously, all three
agencies were regulated under different ministerial level
authorities, charged with conducting various aspects of
competition enforcement. Reform was necessary because they
149. (1) Normative Elevation Reform; (2) Reporting Channels Reform; (3) Law
Reform. See infra Section IV.A.
150. In 2018 the three antitrust enforcement agencies listed in infra note 151
merged into one new super-regulator, the National Anti-Monopoly Agency (the national
antitrust enforcement agency) under the supervision of the SAMR. See Zhan Hao, Song
Ying & Yang Zhan, A New Era Comes – Highlights of the Anti-Monopoly Law of China in 2018],
L/
FIRM
(2018),
https://www.anjielaw.com/uploads/soft/190201/1ANJIE
1Z2011P339.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GCZ-DKCK].
151. The three sub-ministerial-level antitrust enforcement agencies were, the AntiMonopoly Bureau (“MOFCOM”) supervised by the ministerial-level MOFCOM; the
Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau, supervised by the ministerial-level NDRC;
and the Anti-Monopoly and Anti-Unfair Competition Enforcement Bureau, supervised
by the ministerial-level SAIC. In theory, MOFCOM was supposed to focus mainly on
merger control; the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau (“NDRC”) to focus on
tackling price-related anticompetitive conduct; and the Anti-Monopoly and Anti-Unfair
Competition Enforcement Bureau (“SAIC”) was to focus on breaking up administrative
monopolies. However, in practice, these three agencies’ powers frequently overlapped,
and conflicts frequently occurred in the enforcement process. Faced with this multiagency overlap in China’s antitrust enforcement system (aggravated by deficiencies such
as the lack of applicable judicial interpretations, lack of sufficiently qualified experienced
professionals; and the multi-agency operating system’s failure to combat competition
infractions by administrative monopolies) China announced in early 2018 that the three
antitrust enforcement agencies would be merged into one new super-regulator, the
National Anti-Monopoly Agency (which, under the supervision of the SAMR) was created
in May 2018. See Yuan Lin & Shaohua Sun, Fanlongduan Jigou ‘Sanheyi’ Quanmian Tisu (
反垄断机构 ’ 三合一 ’ 全面提速 ) [China Speeding Up the Process of Merging Three AntiMonopoly Agencies into One], JINGJI CANKAO BAO (经济参考报) [ECON. INFO. DAILY] (May
25, 2018).
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had overlapping jurisdiction leading to jurisdictional rivalries,
while they were often absent from the theatre of enforcement
operations.
Although on its face the 2007 Act prohibits SOEs and
administrative agencies from abusing their exclusive rights or
dominant position to restrict or eliminate competition in the
market 152 , the Authors have shown above that the reality is
otherwise: SOEs and government industrial policies often
advance anti-competitive objectives. Without enforcement of
effective punitive measures, the 2007 Act’s prohibition of anticompetitive behavior therefore remains an empty threat in the
minds of China’s SOEs. 153 Therefore, a number of specific
regulations and resource capacity-building measures are required
in order to restrain the excessive exercise of administrative
powers—otherwise respect for antitrust compliance and
enforcement of the 2007 Act will not strengthen. In
strengthening antitrust compliance, the proposed measures
would strengthen the rule of law in China by elevating respect for
competition to the level of a superior norm. Superior to
administrative intervention, this will in turn enhance the position
of private enterprises in China, which have long sought equal
parity with SOEs in China.154

152. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fanlongduanfa (中华⼈⺠共和国反垄断法)
[The Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008) arts. 7, 3237, 50, 2007 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 68 (China); See William E.
Kovacic, Competition Policy and State-Owned Enterprises in China, 16 WORLD TRADE REV.
693, 695 (2017).
153. Wang, supra note 18.
154. Jinbiao Xia, Yi “Jingzheng Zhongli” Yingzao Guoqi, Minqi Gongping Jingzheng
Huanjing (以”竞争中立”营造国企、民企公平竞争环境) [Create a Level Playing Field for
SOEs and Private Enterprises via Competitive Neutrality], ZHONGGUO JINGJI SHIBAO (中国经
济时报) [CHINA ECON. TIMES] (Nov. 8, 2018).
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A. Regulation Enhancement
The specific regulations the Authors propose should be
promulgated by the new antitrust enforcement agency, SAMR,155
and should be directed towards achieving at least three objectives:
(1) first, a normative objective (to make it explicit that
competition is a superior norm over administrative intervention),
reversing the status quo whereby the pursuit of industrial policy
currently trumps respect for competition ideals; (2) second,
reporting channels should be established to allow lower level
administrative agencies156 and market participants157 to have safe
channels to inform competition regulators about competition
infringements perpetrated by SOEs, or where high-level State
bodies apply and pursue non-competition-compliant industrial
policies; and (3) third, strengthening enforcement powers and
reforming the legislative text of the 2007 Act, removing provisions
that currently allow the State to bypass competition in favor of the
so-called public interest. The Authors shall now elaborate each of
these three sets of proposals in turn.

155. Chart 2: The New Structure of the Antitrust Enforcement Agency

The first three columns in the chart above (reading from left to right) illustrate how
the antitrust multi-agency system in China was structured prior to its reorganization in
April 2018, while the column on the extreme right illustrates the updated antitrust
enforcement structure which came into effect in May 2018. The arrows indicate the
transfer of powers and functions from the bodies in columns 1-3, to the correspondinglevel body in the extreme right column 4.
156 . Lower level administrative agencies denote provincial level administrative
agencies or (even lower) city or town-level agencies.
157. Market participants in this context include both SOEs and private enterprises.
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1. Normative Elevation Reform
The first regulation required would demand a reversal of
current norms: one that recognizes the supremacy of the 2007
Act, such that the abuse of special or exclusive rights by dominant
SOEs and administrative agencies would be clearly regarded as
illegal. This would mean that competition law compliance would
become a superior norm in China, thereby aligning Chinese
competition enforcement with the European Union approach
(where competition is not trumped by industrial policy). Two
steps are needed in order to change the current dynamic between
industrial
policy-makers
and
competition
compliance/enforcement.
The first step is structural—SAMR should be positioned
higher in the State hierarchy so that it can prohibit the key
higher-level Ministries responsible for industrial policy (such as
the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (“MIIT”),
the NDRC, and the Ministry of Commerce (“MOFCOM”)) from
issuing industrial policy in China that conflicts with the 2007 Act.
Accordingly, SAMR should be given statutory power to examine
and assess, for competition-compatibility, any existing or new
proposed industrial polices. This should include the power to call
for their amendment or abandonment, prior to their adoption.
Where any industrial policies negatively affect the 2007 Act’s
supremacy, then SAMR should stop the release or
implementation of such policy. This would be the ideal situation.
However, even if SAMR’s role is not elevated in this fashion, the
current situation has been significantly improved because the
three antitrust enforcement agencies (the Anti-Monopoly
Bureau; the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau; and
the Anti-Monopoly and Anti-Unfair Competition Enforcement
Bureau) were all subsumed into the new National Anti-Monopoly
Agency in 2018, which comes under the direct supervision of
SAMR.158 This structural change could support the desired norm
reversal because under the new 2018 structural reforms SAMR
does not envisage any industrial policy-influencing role for the
newly merged enforcement agencies (named above) now that

158. See Lin & Sun, supra note 151 and accompanying text.
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they come under its sphere of influence.159 However, only time
will tell whether these recently integrated agencies will now allow
industrial policy to take a rear seat and instead focus on the
implementation of competition enforcement as their primary
mission.160
The second step needed to achieve the first objective of
norm change is a veto-power. A veto-power should be granted to
lower-level administrative agencies (e.g., provincial or city level
bodies) to allow them invoke the 2007 Act as the basis for refusing
to implement industrial policies which violate the terms of the
2007 Act. This currently does not happen because there is no
explicit statutory veto power that lower level agencies could point
to, which prohibits them from adhering to non-competition
compliant industrial policies or promoting anti-competition
administrative interventions.
2. Reporting Channels Reform
The second set of regulations proposed would be regulations
to establish clear reporting channels, on a statutory basis, to help
both lower level administrative agencies and private enterprises
as follows: simultaneously, with reform initiative (1) above, lowerlevel administrative agencies should be granted legal powers to
report instances of higher level agencies’ failure to respect (or
recognize) the jurisdiction of the Chinese antitrust enforcement
agencies. Analogous to developments in the European Union,
direct reporting channels 161 for lower-level administrative
agencies ought to be established by SAMR in order to help it
prohibit the adoption or implementation of anti-competitive
industrial policies. In addition, the same rights and protections
159. Peter J. Wang, Yizhe Zhang & Qiang Xue, The Integration of Chinese AntiMonopoly Enforcement Authorities, 17 ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 5-6 (2018).
160. Id.; F. Deng, Fanlongduan “Sanheyi” ( 反垄断 ” 三合一 ”) [Merging Three AntiMonopoly Agencies into One], CAIJING MAG. 113-15 (Aug. 6, 2018).
161 . The reporting channel to the European Commission is an example of a
reporting channel in the European Union. Reporting Anti-Competitive Behaviour, EUR.
COMM’N (Sept. 28, 2018), https://europa.eu/youreurope/business/selling-ineu/competition-between-businesses/anti-competitive-behaviour/index_en.htm
[https://perma.cc/P7F9-FLP6]. Tell the CMA about A Competition or Market Problem, UK
GOV’T (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.gov.uk/guidance/tell-the-cma-about-a-competitionor-market-problem [https://perma.cc/AKC7-PLE5] (an example of a reporting channel
at country-level).
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for lower-level administrative agencies should also be conferred
on SOEs, with the aim of allowing them to deflect from having to
comply with or carry out attempted anti-competitive
administrative interventions.
This second set of specific regulations would also provide
market participants, such as private enterprises with mechanisms
for the reporting of, and the right to refuse to comply with, anticompetitive administrative interventions instigated by SOEs, or
anti-competitive industrial policies launched by administrative
agencies.162 Given the fact that the majority of private enterprises
are local, it may be difficult for them to report unfair situations
directly to the newly established SAMR in Beijing. However,
conferring on them the ability to report administrative
contraventions to the new local (provincial) antitrust
enforcement
agencies,
namely
the
new
Provincial
Administrations for Market Regulation (“PAMR”), 163 could be
helpful and effective. In other words, the PAMRs should be the
first contact point for local enterprises to report any unfair
situations, as PAMRs will be best placed to deal with the
competition concerns of locally based private enterprises.
3. Reform of the 2007 Act
The third objective of regulatory reform would be regulations
designed to achieve two key objectives. First, regulations to
embolden antitrust enforcement agencies to halt SOE
competition infringements are required. This will ensure that the
objectives desired by Article 7 of the 2007 Act 164 are not
162 . Xueliang Sha, Fanlongduan Zhuanjia Huangyong: Yanjiu Luoshi Jingzheng
Zhongli Zhidu, Wending Shichang Xinxin (反垄断专家黄勇：研究落实竞争中立制度，稳
定 市 场 信 心 ) [Anti-Monopoly Law Expert Huang Yong: Study and Implementation in
Competitive Neutrality, Promoting Stability and Confidence in the Market], BEIJING NEWS (Nov.
11,
2018),
http://www.bjnews.com.cn/news/2018/11/11/520320.html
[https://perma.cc/4Y8C-PSPY]; Zhanjiang Zhang & Baiding Wu, Governing China’s
Administrative Monopolies Under the Anti-Monopoly Law: A Ten-Year Review (2008-2018) and
Beyond, 15 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 718, 725 (2019).
163. The first PAMRs commenced operations in late 2018 (e.g., in provinces such
as Hainan, Guangdong, Zhejiang) and the remaining PAMRs were established by the
end of 2019.
164. Kovacic, supra note 152; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fanlongduanfa (中华
⼈⺠共和国反垄断法) [The Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug.
1, 2008), art. 7, 2007 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 68 (China).
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frustrated. Second, a clear legislative prohibition is required to
prohibit administrative agencies abusing their special or exclusive
rights, and to prevent them from intervening in privately-owned
enterprises operating in traditional State-controlled industries, or
industries in which SOEs wish to gain control. Third, the
reference to “the public interest” in Article 1 of the 2007 Act
should be repealed if the understanding of that term cannot be
distinguished from the pursuit of the State’s industrial policy.
Despite the fact that Article 7 (in addition to Article 8) of the
2007 Act prohibits SOEs from abusing their dominant position or
harming consumers, Article 7 is currently understood to create a
position of privilege for SOEs in the market (several such
examples are the case studies considered in Part III). This
amendment of the current Article 7 is required because currently
the corrective mechanisms set out in Article 51 of the 2007 Act165
(which are designed to rectify lower level administrative agencies
non-compliance with the Act) are not being used adequately. This
is because under China’s civil service culture, the bureaucrats
(not unlike elsewhere) traditionally tend to shield one another
from blame or public scrutiny.166
Therefore, it is vital for SAMR to first call for the aim and
scope of Article 7 of the 2007 Act to be refocused solely on
prohibiting harm to competitors and consumers and remove the
current protection it is perceived to grant SOEs who engage in
such actions. Second, SAMR should call for the provision of
165. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fanlongduanfa (中华⼈⺠共和国反垄断法)
[The Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), art. 51,
2007 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 68 (China). Where any
administrative organ or an organization empowered by a law or administrative regulation
to administer public affairs abuses its administrative power to eliminate or restrict
competition, the superior authority thereof shall order it to make correction and impose
punishments on the directly liable person(s)-in-charge and other directly liable persons.
The anti-monopoly authority (i.e., now SAMR) may put forward suggestions on handling
according to law to the relevant superior authority. A minor revision to this Article has
been proposed in Article 58 of the SAMR’s 2020 reform proposals, which propose that a
superior authority should report to SAMR that relevant corrections have been taken by
the relevant lower-level administrative organ. However, at the time of writing, SAMR’s
2020 proposals have not yet been adopted into Law. See Fanlongduanfa Xiuding Cao’an
(Gongkai Zhengqiu Yijiangao) (《反垄断法》修订草案(公开征求意⻅稿)) [Draft (for
public comment) on the Amendment of the Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 of China]
(promulgated by the State Admin. for Mkt Regul., Jan. 2, 2020), art. 58 (China).
166. Zhang, supra note 18.
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specific sanctions for SOEs and administrative agencies to halt
their fostering of anti-competitive practices. Third, SAMR should
commence enforcing deterrent effects by making the persons
responsible for infringements personally responsible, such as by
demotion. 167 As demonstrated in the Part III case studies,
adoption of the reforms listed above would open the way for (1)
the number of privately-owned filling stations to increase again
(once discriminatory practices in that sector could be brought to
an end); (2) the removal of anti-competitive exclusionary barriers
in the broadband market, which would encourage private
operators to enter the fixed-broadband market, to the benefit of
consumers and competition; and (3) the pace of “administrative
mergers” in the steel industry, which would be limited only to
those firms who are demonstrably financially unviable and
thereby remove healthy competitors from its reach.168
Finally, the reference to “the public interest” in Article 1 of
the 2007 Act should be repealed if the understanding of that term
cannot be distinguished from the pursuit of the State’s industrial
policy. That would be the capstone of the proposed reforms, as
its repeal would remove “legislative cover” for anti-competitive
industrial policies and inhibit SOEs from actively engaging in
blatantly anti-competitive activities. Without this final step, China
cannot embrace competition philosophy as a core economic and
societal value.

167. In Chinese culture, demotion at work would be seen as a very severe (even
possibly career-ending) penalty to suffer, and would undoubtedly affect one’s prospect
of seeking employment elsewhere, hence it is proposed as an effective deterrent.
168 . Furthermore, antitrust enforcement agencies would have the right to
determine who would gain from compensation awards arising from the anti-competitive
acts of administrative monopoly, with the aim of compensating private enterprises which
have suffered from the consequences of inappropriate administrative intervention. In
order to ensure smooth implementation, specific regulations would also require a
detailed compensation calculation mechanism. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Fanlongduanfa (中华⼈⺠共和国反垄断法) [The Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30,
2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), arts. 46-48, 2007 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG.
GAZ. 68 (China) (detailing the current inadequate mechanism).
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B. Capacity-Enhancement
1. Institutions and Personnel Resources
In addition to the above, both new institutions and
personnel resources are needed. 169 First, personnel: highly
experienced policy and regulatory expertise is needed in the
antitrust policy and enforcement agencies (e.g., in SAMR and in
PAMRs). Training or hiring additional discipline-specific
professionals, suitably trained to conduct sophisticated and
complex antitrust investigations, with particular experience in
combatting unfair practices, will greatly enhance capacity. For
example, having sufficiently experienced competition lawyers
and in-house expert economists, 170 or employing external
competition economists and involving them in the antitrust
investigation process, would build antitrust agency understanding
of what is fair (or unfair) competition in the market.171
The courts in China will accommodate expert witnesses. The
Judicial Interpretation Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on
Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in Hearing Civil Cases
Caused by Monopolistic Conducts [2012] No.5 172 held that parties
169 . Xiaoye Wang, Retrospective and Prospects of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON ASIAN COMPETITION LAW 227-29 (Steven Van Uytsel, Shuya
Hayashi & John O Haley eds., 2020); XUEGUO WEN, YANBEI MENG & CHONGYING GAO,
FANLONGDUANFA ZHIXING ZHIDU YANJIU ( 反 垄 断 法 执 行 制 度 研 究 ) [RES. ON ANTIMONOPOLY L. ENFORCEMENT SYS.] 67 (2011).
170. For example, with regard to the first successful case against an administrative
monopoly, decided by Guangdong High People’s Court in 2015, economists participated
in the Court proceedings as expert witnesses for the parties to help the Court to
understand the complex economic arguments. See, e.g., Jing Wan, Fanlongduan Zhifa
Liangge “Shouli” Zhangxian Fazhi Jingshen (反垄断执法两个 ”首例 ”彰显法治精神 ) [The
First Two Specific Cases of Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Highlighting the Spirit of the Rule of Law],
FAZHI RIBAO (法制日报) LEGAL DAILY, CHINA 6 (Dec. 24, 2015); Diarmuid Rossa Phelan,
The Effect of Complexity of Law on Litigation Strategy, in LEGAL STRATEGIES: HOW
CORPORATIONS USE LAW TO IMPROVE PERFORMANCE 335, 341 (Antoine Masson & Mary
J. Shariff eds., 2010) (pointing out that “the legal system is one which can only be run by
professionals”).
171. Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice E. Stucke, The Fight Over Antitrust’s Soul, 9 J. EUR.
COMPETITION. L. & PRAC. 1 (2018); Giorgio Monti, EC Competition Law: The Dominance of
Economic Analysis?, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETITION LAW: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES
3-4 (Roger Zäch, Andreas Heinemann & Andreas Kellerhals eds., 2010); Guidelines on
the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty [now TFEU art. 101(3)], 2004 O.J. (C 101)
2.21.
172. Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the
Application of Law in Hearing Civil Cases Caused by Monopolistic Conducts, No. 5, art.
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shall apply to the People’s Court to have one or two specialists
with relevant knowledge appear in Court as expert witnesses.
Consideration should also be given to allowing SAMR experts to
act as amicus curiae, to help the courts understand complex
antitrust concepts. Such a facility has been authorized in the
European Union under its 2004 antitrust enforcement
modernization program, which allows European Commission
antitrust expertise to be available to national courts hearing
antitrust cases with European Union dimensions.173
In addition, it would be useful to involve antitrust scholars in
antitrust investigations, since they may often be more familiar
with the 2007 Act and competition philosophy than civil service
antitrust enforcement staff.174 Hence, training professionals175 as
well as introducing more economists 176 and legal scholars to
participate in the work of China’s antitrust enforcement agencies
could help bring about a more professional and less discretionary
perspective to the work of the antitrust agencies. This shall be
particularly relevant in antitrust investigations involving SOEs or
administrative monopolies’ unlawfully interfering with

12 (2012) (promulgated by the 1539th meeting of the Judicial Committee of the
Supreme People’s Court, May 3, 2012, effective June 1, 2012).
173. Council Regulation 1/2003/EC of Dec. 16, 2002, Implementation of the Rules
on Competition Laid down in Articles 101 and 102, 2003 O.J. (L 1/1) (providing that
the European Commission may, with the permission of the national court, appear before
the national court and give its view on European Union antitrust law’s interpretation
where a case before the national court raises such issues). The Regulation obliges
national competition authorities and the Commission to cooperate closely with each
other to ensure the uniform application of European Union competition law across the
Member States. See generally DERMOT CAHILL, THE MODERNISATION OF EU COMPETITION
ENFORCEMENT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2004).
174. Although Chinese antitrust enforcers and Anti-Monopoly Law scholars have
had many opportunities to exchange views, (e.g., at academic conferences), scholars are
rarely consulted by those conducting antitrust investigations.
175. Alfonso Lamadrid de Pablo, Competition Law as Fairness, 8 J. E. COMP. L. &
PRAC. 147, 147 (2017) (pointing out that “Competition law is a legal discipline that is
particularly permeable to changes in economic and political opinions.”); ZHONGGUO
JINGZHENG ZHENGCE YU FALV YANJIU BAOGAO (2013NIAN) (中国竞争政策与法律研究报
告 (2013 年 )) [REPORT ON COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY OF CHINA 2013] 69-71
(Competition Policy and Law Comm’n of China Soc’y for World Trade Org. Studies ed.,
Law Press, China 2013).
176. Marcel Boyer et al., The Rise of Economics in Competition Policy: A Canadian
Perspective, 50 CAN. J. ECON. 1489 (2017); DONG ZHAO, FANLONGDUAN MINSHI ZHENGJU
ZHIDU YANJIU ( 反 垄 断 民 事 证 据 制 度 研 究 ) [RESEARCH ON CIVIL ANTI-MONOPOLY
EVIDENCE SYSTEM] 4, 16-8, 58-62 (2014).
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competition in the marketplace. 177 These reforms will reduce
administrative agencies’ influence and increase the
independence of antitrust enforcement.178
2. Institutional Reform
With respect to institutional reform, two key institutions are
missing from the current China legal framework: an independent
competition authority and a dedicated competition law court.
i. An Independent Competition Enforcement Authority
Based on the European Union experience, an independent
competition enforcement authority is essential. 179 The 2018
institutional reform changes described above—combining the
three previous Chinese antitrust enforcement agencies into
one—does not bring about the creation of a truly independent
competition authority. This is because the new National AntiMonopoly Agency is positioned at the original administrative
level (the sub-ministerial-level) formerly occupied by its
forebears. 180 Accordingly, the new agency will come up against
resistance when it seeks to challenge ministerial-level authorities’
market interventions, e.g., interventions by MOFCOM or the
NDRC.181 In order to carry out “fair competition review,”182 the
177 . This is because cooperation between enforcement agencies and scholars
would help enforcement agencies develop a more sophisticated approach to overcoming
deficiencies in China’s anti-monopoly enforcement approach. See Weiying Zhang,
Chongxin Shenshi Fanlongduan Zhengce de Jingjixue Jichu (重新审视反垄断政策的经
济学基础) [Re-Examining the Economic Basis of Anti-Monopoly Policies], COMPETITION
POL’Y,
DIG.
ECON.
&
INNOVATION
CONF.
(Nov.
30,
2017),
https://finance.sina.com.cn/china/gncj/2020-11-05/doc-iiznezxs0160564.shtml
[https://perma.cc/SK9T-LRKS]. As Monti observes in the context of European Union
Competition Law, “no economist would ever have written Article 81 and 82 [TFEU arts.
101 & 102] in the way that they have been [written] . . . .” Monti, supra note 171, at 3, 13.
178. Wang, supra note 18.
179 . Wouter P.J. Wils, Competition Authorities: Towards More Independence and
Prioritisation? – The European Commission’s ‘ECN’ Proposal for a Directive to Empower the
Competition Authorities of the Member States to Be More Effective Enforcers, in 2017
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW FRONTIERS OF ANTITRUST 8TH INTERNATIONAL
CONCURRENCES REVIEW CONFERENCE (2017); Johan W. van de Gronden & Sybe A. de
Vries, Independent Competition Authorities in the EU, 2 UTRECHT L. REV. 32 (2006).
180. See Chart 2, supra note 155.
181. Wang, supra note 18.
182. This means a competition regulator not biased in favor of State priorities, but
instead governed only by competition norms. See Yong Huang & Baiding Wu, China’s Fair
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new National Anti-Monopoly Agency should be elevated above
ministerial level (the most desirable position). Alternatively,
though less preferably if this cannot be achieved, the National
Anti-Monopoly Agency should be moved out from under the
ministerial-level wing of SAMR and become a ministerial-level
authority in its own right. Admittedly, this is a less strategic
position to occupy in the battle between industrial policy
adherents and those calling for the primacy of competition
principles, but it is certainly better than where the Agency is
currently positioned, lower in the hierarchy at sub-ministerial
level.
ii. A Competition Law Court
A competition law court is required, which can give neutral
judgments in cases contesting administrative intervention in
China, 183 because (1) competitive neutrality is the “new creed”
promoted by SAMR; 184 (2) Judges of the Civil Division and
Intellectual Property Tribunal of the People’s Court (who hear
competition cases) may not yet have the desired level of specialist
knowledge required to enable sophisticated market assessments

Competition Review: Introduction, Imperfections and Solutions, 13 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L
1 (2017). Indeed, in its 2020 reform proposals, SAMR agreed with this suggestion, in that
it proposed the State shall establish and implement a fair-competition review system, in
order to regulate government administrative actions and prevent industrial policies from
restricting competition. Fanlongduanfa Xiuding Cao’an (Gongkai Zhengqiu Yijiangao)
( 《 反 垄 断 法 》 修 订 草 案 ( 公 开 征 求 意 ⻅ 稿 )) [Draft (for public comment) on the
Amendment of the Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 of China] (promulgated by the State
Admin. for Mkt Regul., Jan. 2, 2020), art. 9 (China).
183. The way the European Union’s judicial organ (CJEU and General Court of the
EU) works provides a useful model for China to follow: both European Union courts
follow the rule of law to ensure the supremacy of European Union law and respect by
both State and non-State actors for the fundamental importance of competition law in
the EU. See, e.g., Renato Nazzini, Level Discrimination and FRAND Commitments Under EU
Competition Law, 40 WORLD COMP. 213 (2017); Thomas von Danwitz, The Rule of Law in
the Recent Jurisprudence of the ECJ, 37 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1311 (2014); Mark A. Pollack,
The Legitimacy of the Court of Justice of the European Union, in LEGITIMACY AND
INTERNATIONAL COURTS 143-73 (Harlan Grant Cohen, Nienke Grossman, Andreas
Follesdal & Geir Ulfstein eds., 2018); Michael Blauberger & Susanne K. Schmidt, The
European Court of Justice and its Political Impact, 40 W. EUR. POL’Y 907 (2017).
184. Gairong Hu, Jingzheng Zhongli dui Woguo Guoyou Qiye de Yingxiang ji Fazhi
Yingdui ( 竞 争 中 立 对 我 国 国 有 企 业 的 影 响 及 发 展 应 对 ) [The Impact of Competitive
Neutrality on SOEs and the Legal Response], 6 FALV KEXUE (法律科学) [SCI. L.] 165 (2014);
Xia, supra note 154.
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or apply sophisticated competition law economic concepts;185 and
(3) the People’s Court cannot be regarded as a truly independent
authority (when dealing with antitrust lawsuits involving
challenges to the deployment of administrative powers).186 This is
because the antitrust lawsuit could turn into a battle for
supremacy between administrative intervention and the 2007
Act’s competition objectives. Hence, an independent
competition law court should be established in order to maintain
the balance between the interests of the competing groups
(consumers, competitors, and State) in order to best serve the
public interest.
Setting up an independent competition court modeled on
the General Court of the European Union would be a further
manifestation of how government influence could be removed
from competition regulation. For example, the General Court on
occasion overturns European Commission competition 187 or
merger regulation decisions.188 It cannot be accused of being a
biased adjudicator. Establishing a similar institutional structure in
China would allow China to demonstrate how its regulation of
competition would be divorced from State policy—at present, this
is not true of the People’s Court, which is naturally charged with
serving the State’s interests.
V. CONCLUSION
In seeking to prevent monopolistic conduct, the AntiMonopoly Law of China 2007 inter alia claims to safeguard the
185. The judgment in Qihoo 360 v. Tencent (2013) found Tencent not dominant
(even though it held 87.6% market share in the Chinese instant messaging market) on
the ground that it did not hold a dominant position in global instant messaging market,
clearly indicates that a proper and correct understanding of the concepts of relevant
market and dominant position is urgently needed, even in the Supreme Court of China.
See Qihu Gongsi yu Tengxun Gongsi Longduan Jiufen Shangsuan (奇虎公司与腾讯公司
垄 断 纠 纷 上 诉 案 ) [Qihoo 360 v. Tencent], 2013 SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ. No.
Minsanzhongzi 4/2013 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2013) (China).
186. Wang, supra note 18; Svetiev & Wang, supra note 14, at 195; see generally
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COMPETITION LAW IN ASIA 96 (Mark Williams ed., 2013).
187. For example, the General Court in the Apple Judgment (2020) annulled the
Commission’s decision that Ireland had granted Apple EU€13 billion in unlawful tax
advantages. See Cases T-778/16 and T-892/16, Ireland and Others v. Comm’n,
ECLI:EU:T:2020:338 (2020). See also Case T-13/03, Nintendo Co., Ltd v. Comm’n, 2009
E.C.R. II-975; Case C-338/00, Volkswagen AG v. Comm’n, 2003 E.C.R. I-9189.
188. See Airtours, supra note 66.
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“public interest.” This Article assessed the true meaning of this
concept. This is against the background of the concept not being
defined in the 2007 Act itself, not being interpreted in the
domestic case law, and having no consensus as to its meaning in
the academic literature. This Article has established the
importance of understanding what the concept means. The Act’s
other proclaimed objectives (of protecting consumer welfare,
enhancing efficiency, and safeguarding fair competition) are
merely an empty formula when the State advances noncompetition-neutral industrial policies. Whether via the
preferential treatment industrial policy affords SOEs, or via
administrative authorities’ interventions in the marketplace, State
policy does not prioritize competition objectives.
China’s notion of the public interest is totally different from
that of market economies. In the European Union, market
behavior between undertakings is regulated based on
competition criteria similar to the aforementioned three criteria
(consumer welfare, efficiency, and fair competition) mentioned
above. The European Union only allows non-competition based
criteria, such as “official authority,” “social solidarity,” 189 or
“legitimate interests” 190 invocable only in highly exceptional

189. For the case law on “official authority” and “social solidarity” exceptions, see
supra Part II.
190. On the concept of legitimate interests (art. 21(4) MCR), see supra Parts II &
III. For relatively recent examples, see Enterprise Act 2002, § 58 (Eng.) (permitting the
Secretary of State to prohibit transactions which threaten national security, which was
invoked in the examination of the proposed merger between British Aerospace plc.
(subsequently re-named BAE Systems) and General Electric, which, although initially
opposed, was ultimately approved upon the granting of follow-up remedies). See David
Reader, Extending ‘National Security’ in Merger Control and Investment: A Good Deal for the
UK, 14 COMPETITION L. INT’L 35 (2018); Alison Jones & John Davies, Merger Control and
the Public Interest: Balancing EU and National Law in the Protectionist Debate, 10 EUR.
COMPETITION J. 453 (2014); Michael Harker, Cross-Border Mergers in the EU: The
Commission v. The Member States, 3 EUR. COMPETITION J. 503, 504-06 (2007); Merger between
British Aerospace plc and the Marconi Electronic Systems Business of the General Electric Company
UK
GOV’T,
plc,
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach
ment_data/file/518289/baes-marconi-undertakings-2006.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MYE9-RLLX] (last visited Nov. 13, 2020). See Anticipated acquisition by
Lloyds TSB plc of HBOS plc, OFF. FAIR TRADING (Oct. 24, 2008),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5592bba440f0b6156400000c/LLloydsts
b.pdf_jsessionid_4EBCDA0A4B36535AF8355B90D18E00A2.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/B3UJ-42WJ] (discussing the takeover of HBOS Bank by Lloyds
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situations to either modulate certain aspects of a proposed
merger or permit certain transactions to proceed in the “public
interest.” In other words, in the context of European competition
law, it is relatively rare to find “extra-Competition” criteria
invoked to prevent specific transactions from proceeding in order
to protect some vital national security or wider public interest191
which competition criteria, on their own, cannot be relied upon
to protect.
The analysis in this Article has demonstrated that the 2007
Act’s “public interest” concept is very different from what its
understanding is in the European Union. It is evident that the
public interest frequently trumps the Act’s other three
competition objectives (promoting fair competition between
competitors, enhancing efficiency and enhancing consumer
welfare). This is demonstrated through China’s toleration of
various anti-competitive practices in the commercial sectors
discussed above. It certainly is not intended to be (solely) a
sparingly used control mechanism for protecting vital national
prudential interests (as is the case in the European Union), nor
is it a balancing mechanism between the interests of consumers,
competitors and the State.
Instead, in China the public interest operates to frustrate the
attainment of the 2007 Act’s competition objectives, which calls
into question the acceptance of the 2007 Act in the first place.192
Consequently, this Article concludes that the concept of public
interest is a superior principle in China. If this is to be reversed,
certain steps are needed in order for the 2007 Act to attain what
was intended to be its rightful place, namely that of a superior
principle in China, not to be bypassed at regular intervals by the
State’s SOEs and administrative agencies.

Bank). See also British Sky Broad. Grp. plc v. Competition Comm’n [2010] EWCA (Civ)
2 (Eng.).
191 . This includes preventing the acquisition of a key piece of national
infrastructure or sensitive technology by a hostile power, or a foreign corporation aligned
with such power.
192. ROBERT H. BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 50
(1978) (pointing out that “antitrust policy cannot be made rational until we are able to
give a firm answer to one question: what is the point of the law—what are its goals?” This
statement suits the application of the 2007 Act as well). See also Jonathan M. Jacobson,
Another Take on the Relevant Welfare Standard for Antitrust, ANTITRUST SOURCE 1 (2005).
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The case studies point towards this conclusion, with
outcomes that could not be tolerated under European Union
competition law. In the fixed-broadband industry case study, nonState-owned fixed-broadband operators currently suffer high
barriers to entry in the SOE-incumbent-dominated market place.
Hence consumers in China continue to suffer expensively priced
low speed broadband.193 This situation ought to be regulated by
the 2007 Act, but regulation is not possible because the “public
interest” concept is disregarding the need to eliminate SOEcreated market entry barriers facing non-SOEs seeking to enter
that market. Advancing measures that promote consumer welfare
(e.g., allowing more choice of service providers) is not a priority.
The balance between the interests of SOEs and non-SOEs has
been contaminated by market entry barriers, created by the
telecom SOEs themselves in the fixed-broadband industry.
Other examples examined in the steel industry case study
reveal the lop-sided balance between the interests of SOEs and
non-SOEs, which weighs heavily in favor of SOEs, due to forced
“administrative mergers” and government-led closures of
profitable private sector steel mills. The State gives little
consideration to whether the pursuit of such industrial policy will
lead to a competitive steel production market. Instead of the
efficiency and output of SOEs increasing in that market, the case study
demonstrated that both have in fact declined.194 Forced mergers
and forced closures of profitable competitive private competitors
are practices that would not be countenanced under European
Union merger control law.
In the refined gasoline retail market case study, the balance
between SOEs’ interests, non-SOEs, and consumer welfare was
skewed by SOEs’ exclusionary and discriminatory activities. State
subsidies for refining gasoline and price change mechanisms are
regularly deployed to give the SOEs’ gasoline retail outlets in
downstream markets an unfair competitive advantage over their
private retail competitors. As a result, exit from the market by
private retailers leads to strengthening of SOE vertical
monopolies. This is not a good outcome for consumer welfare or
193. Edward Wong, China’s Internet Speed Ranks 91st in the World, N.Y. TIMES (June
3,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/04/world/asia/china-internetspeed.html [https://perma.cc/4APS-CDYV].
194. See Chart 1, supra note 142.
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competition in that sector in China. Such discriminatory practices
would be condemned as contrary to Articles 102 and 106 TFEU,
were they to occur in the European Union.195
This Article’s overall conclusion is that, after considering
implementation of the 2007 Act, it is not difficult to conclude that
“normal” competition objectives are not pursued in China,
because the State’s interest is to promote the dominance of SOEs,
to the detriment of the interests of non-SOEs, fair competition,
and consumer welfare. In the Chinese market place, government
intervention is an element which never loses focus, because
China’s development model, through its many phases, is
government-led. Administrative intervention by either
government or provincial-level agencies is often biased against
effective competition. Examples of such intervention were
demonstrated in the case studies. Currently, the interests of SOEs,
which are a conduit for the State’s interests, are given top priority
in the Chinese market. The interests of non-SOEs and consumer
welfare are squeezed by government-driven industrial policy
intervention, and unrestrained by weak antitrust enforcement
agencies. In order to achieve marketplace fairness and consumer
welfare, new regulations and future institutional reforms are
needed. If implemented, these reforms will make a significant
contribution to restoring the legitimacy of the 2007 Act’s
objective to protect fair competition. The regulatory proposals
advanced in this Article will strengthen the hands of the different
actors who seek to curtail unbridled anti-competitive
interventions by SOEs and State policies, which currently distort
or eliminate competition in the various marketplaces in China.
Until such reforms are implemented, China’s approach is
not only contrary to how a market economy would characterize
the public interest in the competition context, but it also
undermines China’s stated aims 196 to modernize its economy,
195. See discussion supra Part III (discussing European Union jurisprudence).
196 . Most recently, Chinese President Xi Jinping promised support for the
development of the private sector. See China’s Xi Promises Support for Private Firms as
Growth Cools, REUTERS (Nov. 1, 2018), https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-chinaeconomy-xi/chinas-xi-promises-support-for-private-firms-as-growth-coolsidUKKCN1N64IQ [https://perma.cc/64HZ-PNBH]. The Government also stated the
importance of competitive neutrality. See Sha, supra note 162. The Government official
news agency Xinhua announced “China Intensifies Efforts to Protect Consumer Rights.”
See China Intensifies Efforts to Protect Consumer Rights, XINHUA (Mar. 15, 2018),
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develop a strong private sector, enhance consumer welfare, and
protect fair competition. Therefore, in the struggle for supremacy
between “consumer welfare”/“fair competition” versus the
State’s interests, the “public interest” (in the China context) does
not maintain balance between the interests of the competing
groups (consumers, competitors, and State) in the market.
Instead, our case studies reveal that where there is a supremacycontest between protecting the needs of consumer welfare, fair
competition between competitors, and the short-term national
interest (i.e., the development of SOEs), the State does not adopt
a neutral position with regard to the “public interest”.197 Instead,
it supports and encourages, through its SOEs and State policies,
frequently anti-competitive practices and market activities198 that
neuter the 2007 Act’s competition objectives. There is clear
evidence that the “public interest” concept will not be used to
prevent monopolistic attainment by SOEs by way of their pursuit
of anti-competitive exclusionary practices, contrary to the express
aspirations proclaimed by the 2007 Act. Actions by SOEs and State
administrative agencies trump fair competition, market
efficiency, and consumer welfare. The State, acting in pursuit of
what it perceives as its interests, prioritizes objectives antithetical
to fair competition, market efficiency, and consumer welfare. By
not removing the public interest criterion from the 2007 Act,
China’s “competition” law will remain a pale shadow of what it
was originally intended to be.

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201803/15/WS5aaa420ca3106e7dcc141e5a.html
[https://perma.cc/AMX2-Z4LM] (emphasizing the Government’s desire to break up
monopolies, introduce competition across the economy, as well as enhance consumer
welfare). Only time will tell if this happens.
197. Xianlin Wang, Some Key Issues Concerning Further Development of China’s AntiMonopoly Law, in COMPETITION POL’Y FOR THE NEW ERA: INSIGHTS FROM THE BRICS
COUNTRIES 219, 219-24 (Tembinkosi Bonakele et al. eds., 2017); Horton, supra note 16.
198. See cases cited supra Part III (discussing both anti-competitive SOE practices
and State policies).

